The Paper (S3)

The office is on the third floor of a tired building in a mixed neighborhood of Beirut. The sign downstairs says Al-Mirsad Weekly, though half the letters have burned out. Inside, the newsroom is three rooms, one malfunctioning air conditioner, two dented filing cabinets, and a wall calendar that is still turned to June. Everybody smokes except the intern, who is trying very hard to look like he might smoke if promoted.

The camera pans past a whiteboard with story ideas:

“Corruption in municipal bread contracts”
“Interview with cleric who maybe supports us, maybe doesn’t”
“Why youth are losing their values”
“Profile of martyr’s cousin pending photo approval”

The editor in chief, Abu Hamza, is in his late forties, with reading glasses he keeps taking off for emphasis. He sits behind a desk stacked with old issues of the paper, a framed Quranic verse, and a printer that makes a sound like an animal in pain.

He is in the middle of yelling at the layout guy.

“Why is the headline smaller than the photo?”

The layout guy, Nabil, shrugs without looking up from his screen.

“Because the photo is from WhatsApp and if I crop it any more we lose the rifle.”

Abu Hamza stares at him.

“We are not selling the rifle. We are selling the article.”

Nabil turns to the camera in an interview cutaway.

“He always says this. Last month he killed a piece because the rifle was too small.”

Back in the room, the young reporter, Samer, comes in with a notebook.

“I have the quotes from Sheikh Marwan.”

Abu Hamza perks up.

“Good. Does he condemn the government?”

“Yes.”

“Does he condemn the Americans?”

“Yes.”

“Does he condemn us?”

Samer hesitates.

“He says all unlawful zeal is harmful to the image of Islam.”

Silence.

Nabil slowly swivels his chair.

Abu Hamza leans back.

“That is not ideal.”

Interview cutaway with Samer. He speaks softly and keeps glancing off camera.

“The challenge here is nuance. If a cleric agrees with us on three things and thinks we are criminal lunatics on the fourth thing, the editor says we should focus on the areas of agreement. He calls this editorial balance.”

In the next room, the social media manager, Farah, is trying to explain engagement numbers to two older men who regard the internet as a Zionist trap that also happens to be useful.

She points at her laptop.

“This post did well because it was angry, short, and had a red circle around the thing people were supposed to be angry about.”

One of the men asks, “What thing?”

Farah squints.

“I don’t remember. The point is the circle.”

Interview cutaway with Farah.

“I studied marketing in Dubai. My father thinks I work in publishing. My mother thinks I work in translation. Neither of them is fully wrong.”

A phone rings. Nobody answers it. It rings again. Abu Hamza barks at the intern.

“Yusuf. The phone. Show initiative.”

The intern picks up.

“Yes, peace be upon you. Yes. Yes, one moment.”

He covers the receiver.

“It’s the printer repair man.”

Everybody freezes.

Abu Hamza stands up.

“Tell him the machine is functioning.”

“It isn’t.”

“I know that. But if he comes now, he’ll also ask about the unpaid invoice.”

Interview cutaway with Abu Hamza.

“People imagine underground media is all ideology and bravery. Eighty percent is cash flow. The caliphate fell. The electricity bill did not.”

….

Morning editorial meeting. The whole staff is around a plastic table with tea glasses. On the wall behind them is a poster about media ethics that nobody acknowledges. The editor has assigned a big cover story: “The Moral Collapse of Arab Satellite Television.”

Farah asks, “Do we have reporting?”

Abu Hamza replies, “We have conviction.”

Nabil, still half asleep, says, “Conviction does not fill eight hundred words.”

Samer opens his notebook.

“I can call that professor at the university. The one who talks about cultural imperialism.”

Abu Hamza nods approvingly.

“Yes. Good. But ask him questions in a way that leads to the correct answer.”

Interview cutaway with Samer.

“He says journalism is the art of discovering what you already know.”

The deputy editor, who has so far said nothing, suddenly raises a finger.

“We also need a sidebar condemning the new Turkish soap opera.”

Farah says, “You watch the Turkish soap opera.”

He looks offended.

“I watch it critically.”

The camera catches three other staff members avoiding eye contact.

Then the office door opens and a local fixer comes in carrying a cardboard box.

“I brought the archive issues from storage.”

He drops the box and a stack of old front pages spills across the floor. The camera catches them:

“AMERICA HUMILIATED”
“NEW DAWN FOR THE UMMAH”
“FINAL WARNING TO CORRUPT ELITES”
“SPECIAL RAMADAN RECIPES”

Farah lifts one and laughs.

“You ran lentil soup next to a call for global upheaval.”

Nabil deadpans, “A newspaper must meet all the needs of the reader.”

Interview cutaway with Nabil.

“This place would be much easier to run if the revolution did not keep colliding with domestic life. Somebody is always trying to place an apocalyptic manifesto beside a coupon for discounted school shoes.”

Later that afternoon, Samer comes back from an interview.

“The professor agreed to speak, but only off the record.”

“Why?”

“He says we quote selectively.”

The room goes quiet.

Abu Hamza says, “Selective quotation is the foundation of civilization.”

Farah nearly chokes on her tea.

The camera cuts to her interview.

“The funniest part is that everybody here thinks he is the only honest person in the building. They all think the others are compromised. The editor thinks the deputy editor is soft. The deputy editor thinks the editor is reckless. The religious columnist thinks both of them are insufficiently learned. The business manager thinks all of them are children because none of them understand rent.”

The staff gathers around the printer, which has jammed again while producing the latest editorial. Abu Hamza is trying to pull out the paper without tearing it. Everyone is giving contradictory advice.

“Lift the tray.”
“No, open the back.”
“Turn it off.”
“Don’t turn it off, we’ll lose the file.”

The machine emits a grinding noise and dies.

Silence.

Abu Hamza looks straight into the camera.

“This is foreign sabotage.”

Posted in Journalism, Satire | Comments Off on The Paper (S3)

Eleven Minutes

Rabbi Shlomo Grossbard calls Aaron Lindenbaum on the first of every month from the parking lot of his mother’s facility in Encino, which is the only stretch of the week when nobody can reach him and he has already spent the part of himself he keeps for family.

The call goes the same way it has gone since 2007.

“Aaron. It’s Rabbi Grossbard.”

“Rabbi.”

“How’s the health.”

“The knee’s the knee.”

“You seeing anybody about it?”

“There’s a clinic on Sherman Way.”

“Go to the clinic. You eating?”

“I eat.”

“You in shul?”

“I went for Yizkor.”

He asks four questions and Aaron answers four questions, and then they talk about the Dodgers, who Aaron follows in detail and Grossbard does not follow at all, and Grossbard has learned nine things about a bullpen over nineteen years so the second half of the call has somewhere to go. Aaron never asks him for anything. Aaron asks how the shul is doing, every time, in the tone of a man asking after a business he holds a small position in.

Grossbard timed the call once, in October 2013, out of curiosity, and then timed it four more times, and the average came to eleven minutes. He has never let one run long since.

Then he goes inside and sits with Pearl Grossbard for ninety minutes, which he does every week, and which he has done for six years, and which costs nine thousand one hundred a month against a salary of one hundred and ninety thousand plus housing. That obligation he pays in full. He would tell you the two things are unrelated and he would be lying, and if you pushed him he would stop lying inside of four seconds, because he has no stamina for it.

Hesh Lindenbaum died on November 26, 2007, in a hospital bed set up in his dining room on Alcott, with the good table pushed against the wall and the chairs out in the garage.

He was sixty-two. Pancreas. He had come to the Barn since it had ninety families and he did the High Holiday seating chart by hand for eleven years and took no honors and wanted none. Grossbard was forty. He had been doing the job for nine years and had buried maybe thirty people and still thought of himself as a man who had recently started.

Three days before the end, with the daughter out getting the prescription, Hesh got him by the wrist with a hand that had nothing left in it.

“Aaron.”

“I know.”

“There’s nobody.”

“There’s you.”

“There’s nobody after Tuesday,” Hesh said. “Look after him.”

And Grossbard, forty years old, in a dining room, with a dying man’s hand on his wrist, said, “I’ll look after him.”

He has been over that sentence many times. He has never located a version of himself who could have said something else, and he does not accept that as a defense, because a man who cannot say no in a room should not be allowed in the room.

Hesh left the Barn forty thousand dollars. It went into the sound system and the two rooms at the back, and there is a brass plate in the hallway by the coat room with his name on it that Grossbard walks past nine times a week. Aaron got eighteen thousand and a car. The money was gone by 2011.

The first two years he did it.

Lunch at the deli on Ventura every six weeks. A job lead at a printing outfit in Sun Valley that took, and lasted four years, and ended when the outfit closed. Three thousand dollars in March 2009, out of his own account, never mentioned again by either of them. A letter on Barn letterhead for an apartment application in Reseda, which worked. A ride to a colonoscopy in 2010.

Then the Barn went from two hundred and forty families to four hundred, and his mother started falling, and Dina’s father needed the two operations, and the years did what years do. By 2012 the lunches were twice a year. By 2015 they had stopped.

He put the call on the first of the month because the first of the month is when a man pays things. He set it up the way you set up an autopay, and it ran for nineteen years without a missed cycle, and the reason it never got harder is that it never got bigger.

He can give you the number. Two hundred and twenty-six calls. Something over forty hours. Two lunches a year for two years, one loan, one letter, one ride.

He said he would look after him. He has been servicing the interest since 2009 and has never touched the principal. He is the only man at the Barn who will say that sentence about himself out loud, and saying it has not moved one dollar toward the principal in seventeen years.

On July 1, 2026, in minute nine, Aaron mentions the house.

“The Kaplans sold. New guy’s taking the whole property. He was decent about it. Sixty days.”

“Sixty days from when?”

“The fifteenth.”

Aaron has lived in a converted room off a garage behind a house on Hazeltine since 2016. Five hundred and eighty a month, hot plate, mini fridge, a bathroom somebody put in without a permit. He is sixty-eight. He gets one thousand four hundred and sixty a month from Social Security and works two mornings a week at a print shop in Panorama City that keeps him on because the owner’s father knew Hesh.

“What’s the plan.”

“I’m looking.”

“At what.”

“There’s stuff in Sylmar.”

Aaron does not ask him for anything. Aaron has never asked him for anything in nineteen years, and sitting in that parking lot Grossbard understands that the not asking was built, and that he helped build it, and that a man calls for eleven minutes on the first of the month for two hundred and twenty-six months for this exact purpose. The call is the structure he put up so there would never be a conversation with a number in it.

Dina says bring him here before Grossbard finishes the second sentence.

“There’s the room in front.”

“You haven’t met him.”

“You’ve been talking to him since Nechama was in kindergarten. Bring him here.”

And Grossbard finds out, standing in his own kitchen at 9:40 at night, that he does not want to, and that money was never the constraint, and the board was never the constraint, and that he has spent nineteen years running a discipline he told himself was scheduling.

He says this to her, because he says everything.

“I don’t want him in the house. I want to be a man who wants him in the house. I’ve built a personality out of not pretending, and here I am at fifty-nine finding out the thing I don’t pretend about is money, because money’s cheap for me. I have never once put a room on the table, or a Tuesday, or letting somebody know me who I can’t get away from.”

Dina lets it sit a moment.

“Then go to Van Nuys,” she says.

He has never been to Van Nuys.

Two hundred and twenty-six phone calls and he has never once driven over the hill, and he works this out on the 405 north on a Tuesday in July, which is his day and which he does not give away.

The room is eleven by fourteen. It is orderly the way a room is orderly when a man has almost nothing to put in it. A bed, a dresser, a folding chair, a hot plate, a shelf with maybe thirty books, a television on a milk crate. On the dresser there is a photograph of Hesh and Aaron at somebody’s bar mitzvah in the eighties, both of them in wide lapels, and next to the photograph, squared to the edge of the dresser, the Barn newsletter.

Aaron has been getting the newsletter since 2007. Grossbard has never once thought about the mailing list.

“You want coffee? I have the instant.”

“I’m fine.”

“Sit down. Take the chair, the bed’s soft.”

Grossbard sits in the folding chair and Aaron sits on the bed and they talk for forty minutes, the longest they have spoken since 2010, and near the end Aaron says the thing.

“The guys at the shop, when it’s slow, they get to talking about their kids. And I say, my rabbi calls me. First of every month, nineteen years, hasn’t missed. They can’t believe it. There’s a guy there, Ruben, his mother’s dying, and he says he can’t get his priest on the phone.”

He says it with his hands on his knees, pleased, a man producing his one asset.

“Nineteen years,” Aaron says. “Not one.”

Grossbard finds him a room in a house on Woodman in Panorama City, seven hundred and forty a month, an older woman named Perla who rents out two rooms and keeps the kitchen for herself and does not allow smoking. He pays first, last, and deposit, two thousand two hundred and twenty, out of his own account and not the discretionary fund, because the fund generates a line item and a line item generates a conversation at the board, and he does not want the credit and will not be photographed taking it. He rents the truck himself and moves the dresser with Zalman Fried, who says four words all afternoon, three of them about the stairs.

It is a real thing. It took him three days. It is worth less than what he said in that dining room by a factor he does not attempt to compute.

He gives it from the bimah on Shabbos Shuva.

He does not name Aaron. He gives the year, the dining room, the hand on the wrist, the sentence he said, and then the accounting: two hundred and twenty-six calls, eleven minutes, the first of the month like a bill, nineteen years without driving over the hill.

“I paid the minimum on time every month for nineteen years and I called that fidelity. It’s the smallest payment that keeps an account out of collections. Now here’s the part I want you to take home. I’m the man in this room who tells you what he costs. I put my number in the newsletter. And I have carried one promise I could never fund since I was forty years old, and I made it in a room where no was not available to me, and every one of you has one. Yours is quieter than mine because you have never had to say it into a microphone.”

It runs eleven minutes and it is the best drasha he gives that year.

Marla Feig cries in the third row. Josh Adelman comes up afterward and says the board should start a fund for cases like this and asks him to write up a proposal. Adina Reiss says nothing to him at all, which is how he knows it landed. Ezra Malik, who is eighteen and has an agent, does it in the parking lot on Sunday and cuts the accounting and keeps the hand on the wrist.

By Wednesday four people have told him it was the truest thing they ever heard in a shul.

Rabbi Yoni Belfer hears about it from a woman in his own shul who has a sister at the Barn.

He drives to Panorama City on a Thursday in October and takes Aaron Lindenbaum to lunch at a place on Roscoe and pays and mentions it to nobody. He does it again in November. He does it again two weeks later, and by January it is Thursdays, and Aaron starts telling the guys at the shop about the tall rabbi from Culver City who comes out, and stops leading with the phone calls.

Grossbard hears about it in January from Marla Feig, who has it from her sister-in-law.

He sits with that a while in the coat room, under the brass plate with Hesh Lindenbaum’s name on it, and what he arrives at is that Belfer is half as smart as he is and got in a car, and that no reading of the last nineteen years is available to him in which that is not the matter entire.

He calls on the first of February from the parking lot in Encino.

“Aaron. It’s Rabbi Grossbard.”

“Rabbi.”

“How’s the knee.”

“The knee’s the knee. You hear the bullpen’s a disaster.”

They go fourteen minutes. He notices, and lets it run, and that is what nineteen years has produced, and he is honest enough on the drive home to call it three minutes.

Posted in R. Shlomo Grossbard | Comments Off on Eleven Minutes

Me First vs Team First

I notice in football, many a defensive player makes a sack and then goes into a celebration while there’s a loose ball lying on the turf waiting to be recovered. In basketball, a player will score, celebrate, and then not get back on defense, so his team allows an easy basketball. In baseball, many a hitter will stand at the plate after hitting the ball a long way and lose out on extra bases because he didn’t run hard.

For some defenders, the task was “sack the quarterback.” Mission accomplished. His emotional system immediately switches states from pursuit to triumph. He flexes, points, dances, looks toward the sideline or searches for a camera. Meanwhile the football, which determines possession of the game, may be sitting three feet away.

The coach’s conception of the task is different. The task was “win the play.” If the quarterback fumbled, the sack was merely an intermediate event. Recovering the ball can be worth vastly more than the sack.

A player hits a difficult three. The crowd erupts. He poses, gestures or exchanges something with the opposing bench. Meanwhile basketball has already resumed. His team is playing four against five.

The batter believes he has hit a home run. He watches it. The ball hits the wall. Something that might have been a triple becomes a double, or a double becomes a single. Occasionally a hitter admires a ball that stays in the park and barely reaches first.

There are several internal forces underneath this.

The first is premature cognitive closure. Human action tends to be organized around goals. Once the brain recognizes a goal as completed, attention disengages. Athletes are especially vulnerable because elite performance requires extremely compressed goal structures: beat the blocker, get to the quarterback, make the shot, square up the pitch. That narrow focus is usually an advantage. For a fraction of a second after apparent success, it becomes a liability.

I’m not a huge fan of setting goals because they tend to narrow your horizons and tempt you to cheat.

During the play, the athlete is operating under intense concentration and physiological arousal. Success releases that tension instantaneously. Celebration is almost a neurological exhale. The player has to override that impulse and maintain task attention despite receiving every internal signal that says, “You did it.”

Then there is status signaling. Professional athletes are simultaneously playing the game and performing before an audience. A sack, dunk, three-pointer or long home run is an athletic accomplishment and a public reputation event. The celebration tells teammates, opponents, spectators and cameras: that was me.

Recovering a loose football is enormously valuable to the team. Performing a memorable sack celebration may be more valuable to the individual’s visibility. A spectacular three followed by a gesture can become a social-media clip. Sprinting silently back on defense probably will not. Watching your 440-foot home run carries cultural meaning. Sprinting out of the box because there is a 3 percent chance it hits the fence carries little prestige.

Television intensifies it. Sports broadcasts isolate individual achievements. Cameras find the scorer. Replays focus on the dunk, sack or home run. Social media then extracts those few seconds from the game. The athlete increasingly inhabits two contests at once: the contest on the field and the contest for attention.

A defender can create a magnificent highlight while simultaneously reducing his team’s chance of winning because he stopped playing. From the standpoint of spectacle he succeeded. From the standpoint of the game he failed.

There is another problem peculiar to elite athletes: they are extraordinarily good at prediction. An NBA player usually knows when his shot is going in. An NFL defender often knows whether the quarterback has been brought down. A major-league hitter usually knows what a home-run swing feels like.

Usually.

Their expertise encourages them to begin responding to their prediction instead of waiting for reality. The spectacular mistakes are the tiny fraction of cases in which the prediction is wrong. The basketball player turns toward the crowd before the shot actually drops. The baseball player knows he got all of it until the wind holds it up. The defender knows the play is dead although nobody has recovered the football.

This explains one of coaching’s most repetitive clichés: “Finish the play.”

It sounds banal because the intellectual content is trivial. Every professional athlete knows that you should recover a fumble, run out a hit and get back on defense.

Coaches are trying to extend the athlete’s definition of the play by another two or three seconds.

Football coaches teach players to run toward loose balls even when they think the play has been whistled dead. Baseball coaches teach hitters to run hard until the ball’s status becomes certain. Basketball coaches obsess over transition defense after made baskets because the psychological temptation is strongest precisely after success.

Failure often follows excellence. The player does something difficult enough to produce an emotional reward, and that reward interferes with the elementary action immediately afterward.

Regular people often devote enormous attention to difficult, prestigious actions and surprisingly little attention to mundane completion. Someone gives a brilliant presentation and forgets to send the follow-up email. A surgeon performs the technically difficult portion of an operation and someone misses a routine checklist item. A lawyer wins the argument and overlooks the filing deadline. The glamorous component receives attention because it feels like the achievement. The boring remainder determines whether the achievement actually counts.

From a coach’s perspective, losing because the opponent was better is tolerable in a way that losing because somebody celebrated 1.8 seconds too early cannot be. The latter represents free expected value thrown away.

That may explain why coaches are disproportionately obsessed with behaviors spectators regard as trivial: running through first base, handing the ball to the official, touching every base, falling on the football, sprinting back after a basket, knowing the down and distance, knowing the number of outs.

Championship-level discipline consists partly of refusing to declare victory a few seconds before victory has occurred.

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Mutar Lach

Rabbi Shlomo Grossbard does forty of these between 8:20 and ten o’clock on erev Rosh Hashanah, at a folding table in the back room of the Barn, with the coffee urn going and a laminated card that has been on that table since 2011 and has a ring on it from somebody’s cup.

The procedure takes three men. A man stands in front of them and reads off the card and says he regrets his vows, and the three of them say mutar lach, mutar lach, mutar lach, and he is released. Then he sits down and becomes one of the three for the next man. The released do the releasing. Barry Teitelbaum has a problem with how loose this gets by 9:15, when the third chair is whoever came back from the bathroom, and he has said so for eleven years, and every year Grossbard tells him the halacha does not require a genius in that chair, it requires a body that understands what a vow is.

Zalman Fried takes the left seat at 8:20 and does not get up. He is not on the schedule. He has never been on the schedule.

Michael Danziger is fourth in line and does it in forty seconds. He reads at the speed of a man initialing a lease.

“You regret them,” Grossbard says.

“Deeply.”

“You have no idea what you’re regretting.”

“That’s why it’s deep,” Danziger says, and Grossbard gives him the three words and Danziger is out the door with a coffee.

This is most of it. Men come in because their fathers came in, and they read the card, and the card covers vows they don’t remember making and customs they took on twice and are now stuck with under a rule about repetition that none of them could state. A man who has bentsched from the same laminated card for six years has, by one opinion, obligated himself for life. The procedure exists so he can stop without it counting as an abandonment.

Between petitioners Grossbard talks to Barry, because Grossbard talks.

“Look at what this is. Somebody sat down and looked at us and concluded we make promises we can’t fund. Not once. As a species, on a schedule, every year. So they built a window. And then ten days later, on Kol Nidrei, they annul next year’s before you’ve opened your mouth. They discharge a debt you have not yet been stupid enough to take on.”

“There’s a machlokes about that,” Barry says.

“There’s a machlokes about everything and we say it three times anyway with the aron open and the room standing.”

At 9:40 Danny Perlmuter comes in.

Perlmuter is fifty-one and sells commercial liability out of an office on Olympic with his name second on the door. He is at the 6:20 minyan every morning. Grossbard has seen him there for five and a half years and has thought about him maybe four times.

He does not pick up the card.

“I need to get out of something.”

“Sit down,” Grossbard says.

“I’d rather stand.”

Barry slides the card toward him. Perlmuter puts two fingers on it and moves it back.

“March of 2021,” he says. “Elana was on the sixth floor and they had her on the vent and they weren’t letting anybody up. There was a line of tape on the floor by the elevators and a girl in a chair with a clipboard, and that was as far as anyone got. I stood at that line and I made a neder. Out loud. I said the words. Three tefillos a day with a minyan for the rest of my life.”

Barry stops moving.

“She lived,” Grossbard says.

“She lived. Eleven days later she was breathing on her own and in May she was home and in September she was back at work, and she has been fine for five years, and I have not missed a minyan since March 14, 2021.”

“Not one.”

“I missed my daughter’s meet in Fresno. I did mincha in a parking structure at a wedding in Palm Desert with two waiters and a valet and it wasn’t ten and I stood there until it was. My father died in Chicago in 2023 and I found a minyan the morning of the funeral and the morning after. I did it in Cabo. I found a Chabad in Cabo.”

“How long is the drive from your house to the 6:20?”

“Nine minutes. Fourteen if the light at Beverwil is out.”

“And you have done it two thousand times.”

“Two thousand and eleven,” Perlmuter says. “I keep the count. I don’t want to keep the count. I keep it.”

Zalman Fried has not moved and has not looked away from him.

“Say what you want,” Grossbard says.

“I want out. I want to sleep on a Sunday. I want to go to Fresno.” He stops and starts again in a different voice. “Elana doesn’t know about it. She has never known about it. She thinks I came out of that hospital and got frum in a way she didn’t order and doesn’t like, and she has been polite about it for five years, and last month she asked me if I was happy, and she wasn’t asking about the minyan. She doesn’t know she’s the reason. I never told her, because if I tell her she’ll say stop, and if I stop because my wife said stop, then what was it.”

Barry Teitelbaum goes to work because that is who Barry is and because somebody at that table has to.

“You need charata me’ikara,” he says. “Regret from the beginning. You have to be able to say that had you understood the matter fully at the time, you never would have made it. Do you say that?”

“No.”

“Then I don’t see a release.”

“I’d make it again,” Perlmuter says. “Standing right there at that tape, tomorrow, with what I know now, I’d make the same neder. That’s the problem, isn’t it.”

“That’s the problem,” Barry says.

Grossbard sits back.

“There’s a second problem,” he says. “Yiftach.”

Barry knows where this is going.

“Yiftach goes out to fight and he vows that whatever comes out of the door of his house will go up as an offering, and his daughter comes out of the door. And the tradition looks at this and does not say he was trapped. It says the release was available in the next room. Pinchas was alive. Yiftach could have walked to him and been let out of it in four minutes. And Pinchas thought a judge in Israel should come to him, and Yiftach thought a kohen should come to a judge, and neither man walked, and a girl died of two men’s dignity.”

“That’s aggadah,” Barry says.

“It’s aggadah with a warrant on it. The lesson they drew is that the man who will not go and ask is the one who kills somebody. Perlmuter walked in here. That’s the part Yiftach didn’t do.”

“He still needs an opening.”

“I know what he needs.”

Grossbard turns his chair to face Perlmuter square, which he does about six times a year.

“When you said it at the tape, what did you think you were buying?”

“Her.”

“For how much?”

“Everything. Anything.”

“No. Listen to the question. At that line, on that day, did it enter your mind that you were buying her eleven days on a vent and five years and then a marriage where she sits across from a man who leaves the house at six and won’t tell her why? Did you price that in, or did you think you were buying her and you would still be there when she came home?”

Perlmuter’s mouth goes and nothing comes out of it.

“Because if the second one, then the neder you made and the neder you have been paying are two different instruments, and I can open that.”

“He didn’t say he regrets it,” Barry says.

“He regrets the form. He doesn’t regret the intention. He’s allowed to have those in separate hands and I’ll take the responsibility for saying so.”

Barry sits with it for a while. He is not a soft man and he is not a cruel one and he has been doing daf yomi since 1981.

“Then there’s the wife,” he says. “A vow that touches another person can’t be undone without her in the room. If this neder was made for her, she has an interest in it.”

“It was made to Heaven,” Grossbard says. “She’s the subject. She’s not the counterparty.”

“That’s convenient.”

“It’s correct. It happens to also be convenient. Write in the minutes that the rabbi ruled it.”

There are no minutes. Barry writes nothing.

They release him.

Perlmuter reads the card in a voice that goes at the third line, and the three of them say mutar lach three times, and Zalman Fried says it with the other two, and it is over in under two minutes.

He stands there.

“That’s it?”

“That’s it.”

“I don’t feel anything.”

“You’re not supposed to,” Grossbard says. “It isn’t a sacrament. It’s a discharge. The bank does not weep when it releases the lien.”

“So if she gets sick again.”

And here is where Grossbard could take the fee. The room is his, the man is open, and there are eleven sentences available that would make Danny Perlmuter feel that a professional has handled this and that the accounts are in order.

“She might get sick again,” he says. “She might get sick again on Thursday. It will have nothing to do with the 6:20 and nothing to do with this table. You did not hold your wife’s lungs open for five years with an alarm clock. You are not that strong and neither is anybody, and the reason the tradition built this table in the back of a room with a bad urn on it is that men keep thinking they are.”

“Then what did I do for five years?”

“You kept your word.”

He is at the 6:20 the next morning. Grossbard sees him from the bimah.

He is there the morning after that, and through Sukkos, and into November, and Grossbard stops watching for it around the second week of Cheshvan.

Elana Perlmuter finds out in December. Danny tells her in the car coming back from a dinner in Encino, all of it, the tape on the floor, the words, the count, the three men at the folding table on erev Rosh Hashanah, and he tells it as good news, because he has been released and he has stayed and now it is a gift he is giving her.

She does not take it as good news. She takes five years of a man leaving the house in the dark and no vote in any of it, and a beis din of three men in a back room she has never seen deciding what she had standing to be told. She is right about the standing. Grossbard, when he hears it in January from Marla Feig, who has it from her sister-in-law, says out loud that she is right and that he ruled it the other way and that he’d rule it the same way in September.

Then he goes and sits in the coat room, which is the only room in the building with no chairs and no windows and where he goes when the answer he gave is the answer he wanted.

Zalman Fried comes in for his coat at ten past five.

“You took the left seat at 8:20,” Grossbard says. “You’ve taken it every year since I’ve been here. You’ve never once read the card.”

Zalman puts his coat on and gets the sleeve on the second try.

“1994,” he says.

He does not say anything else. He does taharas on Tuesdays and Thursdays and whenever the phone goes at night, and he has done it for thirty-two years, and Grossbard knows now what it started as, and knows the man has sat at that table forty times a year for three decades saying mutar lach to other men and has never asked for it himself.

“You could get out of it,” Grossbard says. “I’d sit. I’d get Barry. Four minutes.”

“I know,” Zalman says, and goes home.

Ten days later the room is full and the aron is open and Grossbard stands up front with a sefer Torah in his arms and the shul says Kol Nidrei three times, low, then louder, then loud. All vows and prohibitions and oaths and bans, from this Yom Kippur until the next one. Annulled before anybody makes them. The tradition, having watched us for a long time, declines to wait and see.

Danny Perlmuter is in the fifth row on the left, standing, with his eyes closed.

Elana Perlmuter is upstairs on the women’s side in her mother’s seat, and she is standing too, and she has her own account of the last five years, and nobody has asked her for it, and she says the words with everyone else.

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Carolyn Yeager’s Career in National Socialism

Carolyn Elizabeth Yeager came to National Socialism and Holocaust denial late in life. She has written that she was born in June 1941 while Hitler was at the height of his power, and elsewhere identifies June 29 as her birthday. Her parents were Stephen A. Yeager and Barbara J. Schillinger Yeager, both born in Illinois. All four grandparents came from German families originating in Sanktanna, then a German settlement in Hungary. Yeager eventually made this ancestry central to her identity. She has published genealogies taking the Jäger, Schmidt, Schillinger and Reck lines back into eighteenth-century German-speaking Central Europe.

The ideological Carolyn Yeager appears to have been largely a creation of her later adulthood. Her own retrospective says that she became increasingly interested in Germany, World War II and the Holocaust beginning around 2005. That date matters. She was already in her sixties. In a 2014 interview with Lana Lokteff, she discussed an earlier life that included work as a professional artist, something listeners who had known her only through political broadcasting said they had not known. She also described family arguments about Hitler that she remembered from childhood. Her father and grandfather disagreed about him, which means she did not grow up inside a uniformly Nazi household.

Her private life had also long since taken its course. Yeager says she was married to Larry Kahant from September 1971 until April 1981. The marriage resurfaced decades later because Rodney Martin tried to portray Kahant’s surname as evidence that he was Jewish. Yeager responded by publishing photographs and a defense of her former husband.

The political break seems to have occurred during the first decade of the twenty-first century. Her surviving writings from 2007 are National Socialist. In “Women and National Socialism,” written that May, she argued that women should understand motherhood and racial reproduction as their highest social roles and defended National Socialism against feminist criticism. Another surviving essay from April 2007, “Blood, Sweat and Soil,” connects gardening, self-sufficiency, nature and ethnic rootedness. These early pieces show that her politics initially included a substantial cultural and sex-role component alongside race.

Her first organizational home appears to have been Bill White’s American National Socialist Workers Party. Secondary accounts place her as the ANSWP’s Texas state leader from April through August 2007 and as an assistant editor of its National Socialist magazine. Yeager’s own 2014 retrospective confirms that her movement history began in January 2007 with “Bill White and his ANSWP and National Socialist magazine.” She did not remain an organization woman for long. Her later career was overwhelmingly independent.

The decisive turn came when German history replaced contemporary organizing as the center of her work. In 2008 she met Wilhelm Kriessmann online. Kriessmann was an Austrian-born former Luftwaffe officer who had lived through the Third Reich and war. The two developed an unusually productive collaboration. Yeager edited his autobiographical writings and worked with him on translating sections of Hermann Giesler’s memoir Ein Anderer Hitler. Portions appeared in The Barnes Review between 2008 and 2011. She later created a permanent online Kriessmann archive from documents, photographs and writings he had sent her.

A 2009 trip to Germany and Poland accelerated her movement toward Holocaust denial. In March 2010 The Barnes Review published her 48-page Auschwitz: The Underground Guided Tour. Yeager presented observations from Auschwitz-Birkenau as evidence against the established history of the camp. These claims place her squarely within Holocaust denial. “Revisionism” is her preferred term, but the distinction matters because her central assertions include rejection of the well-established mass murder of European Jews in homicidal gas chambers.

March 2010 also transformed Yeager from a writer into a broadcaster. She launched The Heretics’ Hour on the Voice of Reason Network on March 1. By March 2013 she was celebrating its 150th episode. The show evolved from a recorded one-hour program into a live two-hour broadcast. For several months in 2011 she simultaneously hosted a daily program, The Revisionist Report, on Republic Broadcasting Network. Radio gave her something print had not. It made her a node through which a remarkable collection of white nationalists, National Socialists, Holocaust deniers and eccentric revisionist researchers encountered one another.

Bradley Smith became another important relationship. In July 2010, with assistance from Smith and the Committee for Open Debate on the Holocaust, Yeager established Elie Wiesel Cons the World. Over the next six years she says she wrote nearly 130 articles scrutinizing Wiesel’s biography, memoirs, photographs and Auschwitz identification. Her thesis that Wiesel had fabricated his concentration-camp history is unsupported by the historical record, but the project became one of the largest sustained bodies of her work. She eventually closed the dedicated site at the end of 2021.

The White Network was the high point of her institutional ambition. Yeager says she conceived it in early 2012 after becoming dissatisfied with Voice of Reason. She wanted a broadcasting network restricted to whites. TANSTAAFL, the pseudonymous programmer behind Age of Treason, possessed the technical skills she lacked. They created The White Network and launched it in May 2012. Its slogan was “Whites talking to Whites about White interests.” Yeager transferred The Heretics’ Hour there and added other programming while TANSTAAFL built and maintained the technical infrastructure.

Their partnership lasted less than two years. In April 2014 TANSTAAFL concluded that Yeager had moved away from the white-nationalist mission they had agreed upon and shut down new programming without consulting her. Yeager believed the opposite. She argued that TANSTAAFL had become rigidly attached to an American white-nationalist abstraction while she was moving toward a more explicitly German and ethnonational conception of identity. The breakup became extraordinarily bitter. Each accused the other of betraying the project. Yeager created a permanent site devoted partly to documenting her version of the collapse.

By the mid-2010s Yeager was increasingly uncomfortable with generic “white nationalism.” She cared more about ethnicity, nations and Germans in particular. In 2014 she devoted a two-hour program to the differences among race, ethnicity and ideology. In 2017 she attacked the alt-right because it accepted Jews as participants and generally accepted the historical reality of the Holocaust. She criticized Richard Spencer, Greg Johnson, Jared Taylor, Kevin MacDonald, Red Ice and others from a position considerably more uncompromising on Jews and Hitler.

Her relationship to Hitler also became less ambiguous. By 2019 she was openly calling him “the greatest German,” describing him as a source of continuing inspiration and writing that she had been born into a world he was “powerfully influencing.” Whatever ambiguity the word “revisionist” might create disappears here. Yeager became an explicit admirer of Adolf Hitler and defender of National Socialism.

The other unusual feature of her career is the sheer number of relationships that turned into public feuds. Rodney Martin went from guest and movement colleague to the subject of lengthy investigations into his education, employment and biography. TANSTAAFL went from trusted partner to “coward and cur.” Wayne Prante went from someone who approved of her attack on Martin to the subject of a Yeager exposé. Giacomo Vallone, later known as Jack Sen, sought an alliance with her before she decided she wanted nothing to do with him. Deanna Spingola provided Yeager with airtime before Yeager concluded that Spingola’s judgment had become so poor that she should leave broadcasting.

Fredrick Töben is the rare case where Yeager admitted her own role. She met the Australian Holocaust denier in person in 2010 and remembered them as “quite good friends.” They later became estranged for more than three years before his death in 2020. Looking back, Yeager attributed the rupture partly to her “own tendency toward intolerance.” That may be the best single autobiographical sentence for understanding her movement history.

The feuds were not random. Yeager’s method demanded consistency. Once she decided that some proposition was true, compromise became evidence of weakness or dishonesty. Mark Weber’s retreat from aggressive Holocaust denial became intolerable. Kevin MacDonald’s unwillingness to make Holocaust denial central became a problem. White nationalists who admitted Jews, National Socialists who criticized Hitler, Hitler admirers who treated Table Talk as unreliable, and broadcasters who continued giving airtime to people Yeager considered frauds all became potential targets. Her archive reads partly as historical research and partly as an accumulating record of ideological boundary enforcement.

At the same time, she did serious archival work by the standards of an independent amateur researcher. The conclusions were often driven by her ideological priors, but the work ethic was real. She collected documents, compared editions, traced genealogies, translated German material with collaborators, preserved private archives, interviewed elderly Germans and Austrians, and spent years organizing the papers of Kriessmann and the Wenger family. After Kriessmann’s death in December 2012, she preserved his papers online. Willy Wenger later provided her with his brother Leopold’s wartime diaries, photographs and letters, which she also organized and published.

This culminated in The Artist Within the Warlord, published in 2017 under the names Carolyn Yeager and Wilhelm Kriessmann. It assembled their translation and commentary on selections from Hermann Giesler’s Ein Anderer Hitler. Giesler had been one of Hitler’s favored architects. The project suited Yeager perfectly because it attempted to recover a private, cultured and aesthetically serious Hitler from a memoir written by someone who knew him personally.

Yeager spent her later public years near Kerrville, Texas. By then the operation was increasingly a one-woman archive. The Southern Poverty Law Center listed carolynyeager.net as a white-nationalist entity in Kerrville in its 2015 survey, although critics of the SPLC later pointed out that calling a single-person website a “group” exaggerated what was there. That criticism is fair as a matter of organizational scale. Yeager’s influence came from publishing and broadcasting.

Her output gradually diminished. On January 1, 2024, at eighty-two, Yeager announced that she was ending active work on the website. She wrote that she had been receiving signs that it was time to “bow out.” The site now describes her as “Now Retired but Still Readable.” Her archive remains online. A later retrospective from one of her long-term collaborators likewise described her as in her eighties and having stopped writing.

Yeager lived most of her adult life outside extremist politics, married and divorced, pursued artistic interests, and only in her sixties entered the organized far right. From about 2005 through 2010 she moved rapidly from curiosity about German history to National Socialism and Holocaust denial. Between 2010 and 2015 she became a prolific Internet broadcaster and movement connector. After the destruction of The White Network, her work became more solitary, more German-centered, more openly Hitlerian and more concerned with policing the beliefs of people ostensibly on her own side.

She created a small intellectual world around herself and then repeatedly expelled people from it when they failed her tests of historical or ideological consistency. Her career is a study in late-life radicalization followed by progressive purification. The coalition gets smaller as the doctrine becomes more exact. By the end, the website and archive were almost the perfect political institution for Carolyn Yeager because she could run them alone.

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The TANSTAAFL Story

TANSTAAFL, the pseudonymous writer behind Age of Treason, built a systematic body of writing and audio in the American white nationalist Internet of the 2000s and 2010s while keeping his legal identity out of public view. The racial ideology for which he became known arrived after most of the important decisions of his adult life had already been made. He had chosen a profession, married his college girlfriend and had children before he developed a worldview that eventually caused him to classify his own marriage as a racial mistake.

His pseudonym comes from “There Ain’t No Such Thing as a Free Lunch,” the expression most closely associated in American popular culture with Robert A. Heinlein and The Moon Is a Harsh Mistress. His Blogger profile says he began blogging in September 2005. The name suited the outlook he would develop. TANSTAAFL increasingly interpreted politics as a field in which every apparent universalism concealed somebody’s interests and every benefit imposed a cost somewhere else.

I got the fullest account of his early life when I interviewed him in March 2018. He told me that he grew up in New York City. He attended public school through eighth grade and then a private Catholic college-preparatory high school. He went on to college, where he studied mathematics and computer science. Carolyn Yeager, who later worked with him closely, described him as a professional computer programmer.

College also supplied the relationship that would become the central private complication of his later politics. He met his future wife there. Her father was Jewish and her mother was not. Her father had married outside the Jewish community and died when his daughter was about ten. According to TANSTAAFL, his wife received little Jewish religious or cultural formation and did not identify as Jewish as an adult. Describing her simply as “Jewish” therefore misses part of the story. TANSTAAFL eventually regarded her as racially half Jewish even though she did not understand herself that way.

He knew before the marriage that her father had been Jewish. At the time it meant almost nothing to him. He remembered visiting her grandparents before the wedding and being inspected by her Jewish grandfather’s friend, who remarked that “it doesn’t get much more goy than this.” TANSTAAFL told me he did not even know what “goy” meant. Decades later he remembered the remark differently. By then he had developed a theory in which Jews possessed a strong and persistent ethnic consciousness while whites had been trained to suppress theirs. A minor encounter from his youth became retrospective evidence for a theory acquired much later.

For roughly twenty years after college, he told me, politics occupied little of his attention. Career and family came first. The political awakening appears to have occurred in stages after he moved to Southern California. Immigration supplied the issue that eventually organized the others. In a later autobiographical account he wrote that watching Southern California’s demographic transformation forced him back into politics. At first he thought politicians had misunderstood what Californians wanted. He eventually decided that political and media elites understood the opposition perfectly well and were ignoring it.

His reconstruction of the period incorporates many of the political shocks that shaped conservative Southern California from the early 1990s onward, including the 1992 Los Angeles riots, the O.J. Simpson trial, September 11, the Iraq War and immigration. The immediate stimulus for public writing appears to have been the political and racial argument surrounding Hurricane Katrina in 2005. Age of Treason began that September.

He remembered growing up with racial indifference. His early political movement was toward ordinary American conservatism and then toward neoconservatism, which he initially regarded as more intellectually serious than the alternatives. The radicalization came through reading and argument rather than through an inherited movement milieu.

Among the important transitional figures were Steve Sailer, Jared Taylor and Lawrence Auster. His surviving 2007 writing allows us to watch some of the movement almost in real time. In November of that year he was writing about “White Nationalism and Anti-Semitism” while remembering how strongly he had once recoiled from talk about specifically white interests. Within the next few years race became the organizing principle through which he interpreted immigration, political institutions and history.

The decisive intellectual influence appears to have been Kevin MacDonald. MacDonald supplied TANSTAAFL with something more powerful than a collection of grievances. He supplied an explanatory system. TANSTAAFL increasingly interpreted Jewish history, political behavior and institutional success through an evolutionary account of group competition. The attraction is easy to understand at the level of intellectual form. A collection of apparently unrelated events could now be reduced to a few mechanisms involving ethnocentrism, coalition, reproduction, group persistence and competition.

By TANSTAAFL’s own account, he began criticizing Jews explicitly around the end of the 2000s. Then his new theory collided with the biography he had already lived. Around 2010 he published what he remembered as “A Personal Disclosure,” telling readers that his wife’s father was Jewish. The disclosure mattered because TANSTAAFL had reached a conception of Jewish identity that was biological as well as religious and cultural. A fact about his wife that had been incidental when he married her had become, inside the theory he now believed, a fact about himself.

He described that realization to me with extraordinary severity. He said he felt “compromised.” He believed that if his racial analysis was correct, his own descendants occupied a category his political commitments told other whites to avoid creating. Yet the discovery produced no corresponding domestic crisis. When I asked what consequences his increasingly anti-Jewish politics had produced for his marriage, his answer was immediate: “None!”

His explanation was that his wife knew what he believed and largely agreed with him. She did not identify as Jewish and apparently did not experience his attacks on Jews as attacks on her. Her father had married a non-Jewish woman and died while she was young. TANSTAAFL consequently treated her ancestry and her identity as two different things. His politics insisted that ancestry mattered. His marriage demonstrated that lived identity could matter more in the ordinary conduct of a family. He never reconciled those propositions philosophically. He simply lived with both.

He did not revise the theory to accommodate the woman he loved. He absorbed his wife and children into the theory. He told younger white nationalists that his life should not be interpreted as permission to imitate him. He described marrying someone of Jewish ancestry as a mistake and said he wanted younger white men and women to avoid making it. The family endured while the doctrine became harsher.

The movement from blogger to broadcaster began before the creation of the White Network. TANSTAAFL appeared with Carolyn Yeager on her broadcasts in early 2012. Yeager later described approaching him because she wanted to create an independent Internet radio operation and knew that he possessed the programming skills she lacked. The resulting White Network launched in 2012 around the slogan “Whites talking to Whites about White interests.” TANSTAAFL handled much of the technical architecture while producing Age of Treason Radio.

The partnership placed him inside a white-nationalist project. An archived account of their first broadcast records him explaining that his conception of white nationalism could encompass broad racial solidarity while retaining narrower attachments to family and local people. His hierarchy began with family and extended outward through progressively larger groups.

That same early broadcast contains one of the few clues about his later geographical life. TANSTAAFL said that he had moved “to the mountains here in Appalachia.” He described encountering a culture different from the one he knew and accepting that he might never fully become part of it, while hoping that his children and grandchildren would.

If true, the move gives his life an evocative geography. He began in New York, came of age in a Catholic educational environment, studied mathematics and computing, built his adult career and family, experienced his political awakening in Southern California, then moved toward Appalachia while developing a politics organized around ancestry, place and group continuity. The movement from metropolitan New York to Southern California to the Appalachian mountains almost reads like a physical counterpart to his ideological search for increasingly bounded forms of belonging.

The White Network lasted until April 2014. Its ending was ugly. TANSTAAFL concluded that Yeager had departed from what he understood as the network’s white-nationalist purpose. Without obtaining her agreement, he stopped new programming and shut down the collaboration. Yeager regarded this as a betrayal and spent years publishing hostile accounts of his conduct. Her testimony after the rupture has to be read with that history in mind, although both sides agree on the basic facts of the breakup.

Yeager also fell out publicly with Rodney Martin, Fredrick Töben, Wayne Prante, and Giacomo Vallone/Jack Sen.

The dispute reveals something about TANSTAAFL’s temperament. His politics repeatedly became arguments about classification. Who counted as white? What was a nation? What distinguished white advocacy from white nationalism? What was the relationship between ancestry and identity? What did a political term smuggle into an argument before the argument had begun? His background in mathematics and programming may be relevant here. He approached political language as though conceptual errors could propagate through a system like bad assumptions in a formal model.

He was temperamentally distant from one of the styles that later defined the alt-right. He disliked endless layers of irony. During my 2018 conversation with him I remarked on how unusual it was to talk with someone from that milieu who seemed to mean exactly what he said. “I hate sarcasm and irony,” he replied. That made him easier to interpret than many contemporaries who moved continuously between assertion, joke, provocation and retreat.

His preferred style was earnest, analytical and taxonomic. Science, history, anthropology, psychology and political events were brought together in an attempt to construct one explanatory account of group conflict. Admirers noticed the same feature. A sympathetic 2022 retrospective praised his methodical presentation and his effort to extend MacDonald’s framework. It also preserved TANSTAAFL’s own chronology: Age of Treason began in September 2005, the radio project began through the White Network in June 2012, and the writing and audio were consolidated at age-of-treason.com beginning in May 2014.

His public radicalism continued after the Yeager split. In 2014 he appeared on Majority Rights. By October 2015 Red Ice introduced him as a pseudonymous “racialist blogger and podcaster” whose interests included science, history, psychology, language and Jewish influence. The description captures the strange mixture that made Age of Treason distinctive. It looked like an attempt to manufacture a comprehensive anthropology of political conflict.

The worldview eventually carried him far beyond immigration restriction or racial separatism. By the time I interviewed him in 2018 he spoke sympathetically about National Socialism and Hitler. At one point he said “Hitler did nothing wrong.” When I laughed, he emphasized that he meant the statement seriously.

Yet even at the point of maximal ideological radicalism, the family contradiction remained intact. TANSTAAFL could describe Jews collectively as an enemy while remaining married to a woman whose father was Jewish. He could regard ancestry as politically decisive while describing his own marriage as successful. He could warn strangers against reproducing the family pattern that had produced his children while speaking about those children as part of the intimate center from which his conception of group loyalty radiated outward.

His theory told him the marriage had been a mistake. His life told him to remain married. His theory told him Jewish ancestry had biological significance. His experience told him that his wife’s loyalties, beliefs and conduct aligned her with him. The doctrine won the argument in the abstract. Ordinary attachment won the decisions that had to be made every day.

TANSTAAFL’s radicalization occurred largely in middle age. The familiar story of Internet extremism involves young people encountering an ideological subculture while their identities are still being formed. TANSTAAFL appears to have been professionally established, married and a father before he constructed his mature politics. The Internet supplied an arena in which a middle-aged technical professional could spend years rebuilding his interpretation of history from the ground up.

His output declined after the middle of the 2010s. Yeager claimed that he had begun repeating himself. TANSTAAFL expressed something similar in less hostile terms, saying that he increasingly felt he had already said what he wanted to say and was devoting more attention to his profession. Podcasting diminished. Blogging continued at a slower pace. The Age of Treason archive nevertheless remained online, and sympathetic readers continued circulating his older audio long after his most productive period had ended.

That gives his public career a coherent arc. He moved from political disengagement into immigration restriction, from immigration into racial consciousness, from racial consciousness into MacDonald’s account of Jewish group behavior, from blogging into white-nationalist broadcasting, and finally into an increasingly comprehensive racial interpretation of Western politics. At each stage the explanatory system became more encompassing. By the end, almost every major political conflict could be assimilated into competition among racial and ethnic groups.

The cost of such explanatory power is visible in the marriage. A theory that can explain everything also acquires the capacity to redescribe everything. The woman TANSTAAFL had met and married before any of this began became, retrospectively, evidence of his former racial unconsciousness. A joking remark by her grandfather’s friend became evidence of Jewish ethnic awareness. His children’s ancestry became evidence of his own failure. Experiences that once possessed ordinary meanings were reassigned places inside the new system.

His importance lies in the unusual amount of intellectual archaeology his surviving work permits. We can see the before and after. We know enough about the man he says he was before 2005 to watch the later man reinterpret him. We can watch a political theory move backward through a biography and change the meanings of events that happened decades before the theory existed.

That process may explain both the intensity of his work and its eventual exhaustion. Once immigration, race, Jewish history, liberalism, conservatism, war, media, psychology and family had been incorporated into the same framework, fewer questions remained. The theory had reached its mature form.

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The Christopher Caldwell Career

Christopher Caldwell’s career is a story of institutional migration. The strongest longitudinal evidence comes from The Weekly Standard, whose archive contains 428 Caldwell bylines from 1995 through 2018. In the mid-1990s he was recognizably a movement-conservative generalist writing about Medicare, Jack Kemp, electoral politics, Haiti and culture. By the middle 2000s, Europe had moved toward the center of his work. The European Union, borders, democratic legitimacy and the durability of national political communities became recurring subjects. The financial crisis added the euro, oligarchy, welfare states and the political consequences of economic integration. By 2018 his writing was saturated with Brexit, immigration, populism and sovereignty.

That chronology matters because it means Caldwell’s intellectual transformation largely happened before The Weekly Standard disappeared. The post-2018 change was institutional. His publication ecology split into two tracks. One ran through Claremont Review of Books, Compact, The Lamp, UnHerd and The Spectator. The other remained inside prestige institutions, most conspicuously The New York Times. Simon & Schuster’s biography still describes him as both a contributing editor of Claremont Review of Books and a contributing Opinion writer for The New York Times.

What is surprising is how little ideological code-switching this arrangement appears to require. Caldwell does not seem to write one politics for The Times and another for his postliberal readers. The same questions cross the boundary. Is globalization compatible with democracy? Can international institutions override national electorates without eventually provoking revolt? Does immigration change the character of a political community? Does American universalism produce foreign-policy disasters? Do supposedly neutral legal regimes transfer power from voters to administrators, judges and experts?

His New York Times work makes the point. He has used the paper to criticize the political power acquired by finance through climate policy, to argue that the United States helped create the conditions for the Ukraine war and to introduce American readers to the German sociologist Wolfgang Streeck. Caldwell’s engagement with Streeck, a longtime contributor to New Left Review, complicates the idea that Caldwell simply moved farther right. Streeck argues that neoliberal globalization constrains democratic choice and helps generate populist revolt. Caldwell has found that analysis useful for understanding movements of both left and right.

Caldwell began as a Reagan-era conservative, but his mature political economy has absorbed arguments that sit uneasily with Reaganism. Free trade loses its presumptive innocence. Global economic integration becomes politically suspect. Democracy becomes inseparable from national sovereignty. American democracy promotion becomes dangerous. Populism becomes a predictable attempt by electorates to recover powers that political institutions have surrendered.

That makes “radicalization” an inadequate description. Caldwell did not simply become a more intense version of the conservative he already was. He abandoned or revised important elements of the political settlement within which his early career began. Parts of the anti-globalist left supplied concepts that helped him do it. His mature work therefore occupies a space in which Streeck, Brexit, Orbán, Trump, Syriza and Sahra Wagenknecht can appear inside the same analysis because they are responses to a common problem: the widening distance between democratic electorates and institutions insulated from them.

There is also evidence against the claim that Caldwell’s principles merely follow coalition advantage. In Compact he has attacked Trump from within the newer nationalist ecosystem. In 2025 he criticized Trump for threatening Columbia University through federal civil-rights enforcement, the machinery Caldwell had spent years criticizing when progressives controlled it. He also criticized Trump’s tariff policy and opposed the Iran war. These are useful within-person tests. Caldwell’s hostility to certain institutions does not disappear when his political side gains control of them.

The result is a career with two publication ecosystems but little discursive bifurcation. The New York Times often gets Caldwell the translator, explaining Streeck, European nationalism, Ukraine or populist discontent to readers who may dislike his conclusions. Claremont Review of Books gets more of Caldwell the theorist and historian. Compact gets the faster political polemicist. The Lamp gets more of the religious and literary foundations. The Spectator and UnHerd get current political diagnosis. The genre changes with the venue. The underlying questions travel.

Caldwell’s postliberal turn occurred largely inside the institutions of the old conservative establishment. After those institutions weakened or disappeared, his work migrated into a new nationalist and postliberal ecosystem while he retained access to major liberal prestige outlets. He became more distant from the liberal consensus without becoming illegible to its gatekeepers. That may be the most unusual fact about his career: Caldwell acquired two audiences without acquiring two political voices.

Caldwell research.

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Faculty Fashion Since The 1960s

Over the past sixty years the American professor stopped dressing to mark distance from students and started dressing to mark distance from administrators, consultants, and money. In the 1960s the jacket and tie helped make the professor visible as a professor. By the end of the century, authority could survive open collars, sweaters, jeans, T-shirts, beards, sneakers, and deliberate eccentricity. The profession gained sartorial discretion and lost a uniform.

A longitudinal study of Duke University yearbooks makes the transition measurable. The 1965 Chanticleer photographed the people heading Duke’s academic departments. Twenty-four of the 25 wore neckwear. Twenty-three wore conventional ties and one wore a bow tie. Eighteen wore civilian jackets or blazers. The sample contained no open collars, T-shirts, beards, or hair reaching the collar. Among the named academic adults in the 1970 Chanticleer, conventional ties appeared on 12 of the 18 people whose neckwear could be judged. By 1975, the comparable number was six of 12. T-shirts appeared. Five of 11 observable faculty had hair reaching the collar. Three had beards. In the 1990 Chanticleer faculty sample, only two of 12 observable professors wore conventional ties, while eight of 11 showed open collars.

The old costume dissolved by components. The tie became optional before the jacket. Open collars spread before jackets disappeared. Long hair and beards arrived after tie optionality was already visible. Formal and countercultural elements could then be recombined. A professor could wear a tie with long hair, a jacket with an open collar, a beard with a blazer, or a T-shirt with enough academic authority that nobody needed an explanation.

That Duke evidence comes from a ChatGPT coding project. Each garment variable was coded present, absent, or not observable. Missing visual information stayed missing. The study separately recorded photographic setting because a formal publicity portrait, office photograph, classroom scene, laboratory image, outdoor candid, and deliberately comic portrait create different opportunities for clothing. Selection mechanism was also kept separate because a rank-defined roster of department heads differs from an editor’s selection of interesting personalities.

A 1969 Virginia Tech thesis, Nancy Garland Dearing’s “Selected clothing practices of male university professors,” surveyed 440 male professors about what they wore and sorted the answers by age, rank, and field. Faculty over fifty, whose clothing closely resembled that of full professors, were the likeliest to wear suits, white shirts, ties, wing tips, and tweed or corduroy jackets. The youngest professors favored turtlenecks, colored oxford shirts, open collars, sweaters, loafers, beards, cuffless trousers, and jackets removed in class. Business professors owned the most expensive suits and were especially likely to keep their jackets on. Natural scientists favored sweaters and open-neck shirts. Architects favored tweed, corduroy, and bow ties. Engineers wore ties but bought cheaper suits and removed their jackets in class.

Dearing caught the professoriate immediately before its visual grammar fragmented. The differences by field already matter. The natural scientist and business professor inhabited different occupational worlds. Academic casualization therefore began from several baselines. A law professor dealing with judges, alumni, clients, and practicing lawyers lived closer to the suit. A laboratory scientist could remove the jacket. An architect could convert formality into tweed. A literary intellectual could make refusal of commercial polish into part of the intellectual persona.

The old costume distinguished the professor from two neighboring elites. Gray flannel, oxford cloth, tweed, knit or rep tie, leather shoes, perhaps the famous leather elbow patch, made him look respectable without looking commercial. He was a gentleman of modest means. The banker’s smooth worsted suit and the salesman’s shiny prosperity were as wrong as the undergraduate’s sweatshirt.

Mid-century faculty and elite students often shared a formality. A jacket and tie did not always say “professor rather than student.” It could say adult, respectable, educated, male, institutional, and middle or upper-middle class. Universities enforced dress expectations on students as well as faculty. College students had already contributed greatly to the invention of American casual clothing, but formal campus spaces remained formal.

The social revolution of the late 1960s changed the reference groups. The younger cohort hired during the great university expansion of the 1960s and 1970s wore jeans, work shirts, corduroy, turtlenecks, boots, beards, and open collars as student dress codes collapsed and political identification with the Vietnam-era establishment became toxic in many academic fields. Casual dress signaled solidarity with students, labor, artistic bohemia, or the counterculture.

The crucial movement was relational. The professor could distinguish himself from businessmen and administrators by looking closer to students. Academic informality communicated distance from one hierarchy by borrowing the costume of another group.

In November 1970 the Harvard Faculty Club was holding a referendum on whether to retain its coat-and-tie rule. Nobel laureate George Wald called the requirement “ridiculous,” “embarrassing,” “anachronistic,” and “stuffy.” One defender of the rule wrote, “Keep out the riff-raff.” Another suggested that Harvard should encourage individuality, prompting the reply, “Individuality? yes, in the color of ties.” Two years earlier the undergraduate Houses had stopped requiring coats and ties at dinner.

The humor of the referendum comes from a status system recognizing that its signals were losing consensus. The tie had once been ordinary enough to disappear into the background. By 1970 wearing or refusing it could express a position.

The University of Virginia recorded the same transition through an almost perfect anecdote. Its institutional history describes professors going barefoot and a Berkeley-trained assistant professor being mistaken for a disheveled student. A senior professor saw the young man outside his office and sent a secretary to tell the supposed student to make himself presentable. The secretary returned with the news that he was the new assistant professor of physics.

Clothes had once provided enough information to sort professor from student. Now they could mislead.

Duke lets us see that casual professors existed before the institutional costume collapsed. The 1965 yearbook organized its Faculty section around department chairmen who coordinated staffs and academic programs, linked faculty with administration, and represented the university’s academic excellence. The photographs then represented those officeholders through an overwhelmingly formal code. Twenty-four of 25 wear neckwear.

Elsewhere in the same volume, Duke ran a Campus Personalities feature. Peter Klopfer, a zoology professor, appears in a short-sleeve open-collar shirt with no jacket or tie. The prose describes his intellect, humor, scientific curiosity, classroom style, and participation in civil-rights marches. Reynolds Price appears as an intense young creative-writing teacher. Robert Durden is remembered for his pipe, vest, bow tie, boutonniere, and informal manner. Richard Leach appears as an associate professor whose easygoing manner carries into his teaching.

The formal 1965 university therefore contained several professorial types. Institutional office compressed them into a narrow costume. Personality representation let some differences through.

That is why the 1965 Duke Chanticleer result cannot support the sentence “professors wore ties.” Rather, when Duke’s yearbook represented academic institutional authority through department heads, almost everybody wore neckwear.

The 1970 Chanticleer changes both the clothes and the editorial machinery. Its academic sequence mixes professors, departments, deans, teaching scenes, offices, outdoor photographs, and activity portraits. W. B. Peach appears in jacket and tie. Henry Fairbank is photographed sitting on a car in a sweater. Thomas Langford wears a tie without a jacket. Peter Klopfer again appears in a short-sleeve open-collar shirt. Richard Kramer teaches at a blackboard without a tie. Buford Jones remains fully formal outdoors.

Conventional ties fall to 12 of 18 observable academic adults. Jackets remain on ten of 17. Open collars appear in three of 16. Yet hair reaching the collar remains zero among 20 observable people, and beards remain zero.

That finding overturns one of the attractive stories with which the project began. Long hair does not lead the transition in these Duke samples. The tie is already losing its obligatory character while hair remains visually conventional.

The Duke coding therefore separated environmental portraits, staged activities, and documentary candids. Among those comparable photographic modes, conventional ties appear on about 67 percent of observable academic adults in the 1970 Chanticleer. In the 1975 Chanticleer the raw comparable rate falls to about 45 percent. Reweighting the 1975 photographs so their mix of photographic modes matches 1970 raises the estimate only to about 51 percent. The decline remains.

Jackets tell a different story. After the same adjustment, 1975 jacket prevalence is roughly the same as 1970. Open collars rise.

The suit-and-tie package decomposed. The tie lost compulsory force early. The jacket survived as an adaptable garment that could bridge old and new codes. A professor could retain the jacket while abandoning the tie. The jacket could then coexist with an open collar, beard, long hair, unusual shirt, or casual trousers.

The 1975 Chanticleer makes that recombination visible. Victor Strandberg wears a jacket and striped tie with hair reaching his collar. Martin Miller wears a short-sleeve open-collar shirt with longer hair and a full beard. Janis Antonovics appears in a greenhouse in a T-shirt with longer hair. Frank Borchardt teaches in a jacket over an open-neck shirt with a beard. Charles Berquist sits in his office with his feet up on his desk. Roger Corless appears in a cafeteria in an open-collar shirt with beard and longer hair.

Allan Bone remains formal between 1965 and 1970. Peter Klopfer remains casual. Buford Jones remains formal between 1970 and 1975.

George Pearsall supplies the most valuable changing case. In 1970 he is represented as Dean of Engineering and wears a conventional tie. Twenty years later, in the 1990 Chanticleer, he appears as a professor in Mechanical Engineering and Materials Science wearing an ordinary open-collar shirt with no jacket.

Pearsall changes across time, but he also changes represented role. The same person can carry different visual obligations when the image says “dean” and when it says “professor.”

The strongest test of this distinction comes from the 1970 yearbook. After the academic sequence, the volume presents senior university administrators. The chancellor pro tem, president, provost, vice president, deans, and registrar produce ten jackets out of ten. All nine whose neckwear is clearly observable wear conventional ties.

The academics in the same book are much less uniform. Same university. Same year. Same student publication. Same surrounding culture. The major difference is the role being represented.

The president, dean, department chair, provost, and registrar embody offices. Their photographs communicate organizational authority. Clothing helps make the office legible. A scholar’s authority increasingly comes from another bundle of credentials: publications, tenure, disciplinary reputation, grants, prizes, endowed titles, expertise, citation, and classroom recognition. As those signals strengthen, the clothes can carry less of the burden.

The result also explains why administrators often remain formally dressed after faculty casualize. The administrator benefits from looking like the institution. The professor may eventually benefit from showing distance from it.

Different professions became differently informal. Dearing’s 1969 data already show business professors dressing differently from natural scientists and architects. The relevant boundary was occupational. A law professor who met judges, clients, alumni, and practicing lawyers lived closer to the suit. A physicist could remove it. An architect could replace it with tweed. A literary theorist could make refusing it part of the theory.

Harvard Law School later produced an almost laboratory-quality example. Douglas Ginsburg joined the faculty in the 1970s and, according to a 1987 Los Angeles Times profile, continued wearing suits and ties to class through a period when colleagues remembered him as strikingly untouched by the political and cultural upheavals around him. Duncan Kennedy of Critical Legal Studies went in the opposite direction. A 1992 Vanity Fair account described Kennedy’s black turtleneck, jeans, work boots, and beard as part of his challenge to the traditional Harvard professor’s role. Same institution, same profession, same broad generation. Ginsburg retained the visual language of courts, government, and professional authority. Kennedy dressed against it.

By 1990, Duke’s Chanticleer has an Academics section that presents professors as intellectual personalities. Frank Lentricchia talks about teaching, Duke undergraduates, the English department, Durham, and the intellectual controversies surrounding his field. Kristine Stiles discusses scholarship, teaching, art, and the relation between them. Bruce Lawrence talks about research, classroom preparation, history, religion, expertise, and the work of faculty. George Pearsall talks about engineering education.

Open collars, sweaters, and casual jackets sit comfortably beside serious discussions of scholarship and teaching. Faculty casualness has ceased to look oppositional. A behavior has completed its transition when observers stop needing a story about why it occurred.

The 1990 student comparison strengthens the point. The fixed sample of 20 editor-selected student portraits contains three instances of neckwear if the bow tie is included, while the faculty sample contains two conventional ties among 12 observable professors. Jackets are also surprisingly close in raw prevalence.

The similar garments sometimes carry different meanings. Students use formal clothes theatrically. Lawrence Glazer wears a bow tie and formal jacket. Douglas Perlman wears a matching dark suit and tie. Karen Weaver combines a plaid blazer and loose tie with a T-shirt. Formality has become one style among other available student performances.

Faculty casualness is quieter. Pearsall wears an open shirt. Edward Hill wears a polo. David Paletz wears a sweater over an open collar.

The visual institution changes alongside the clothes. In 1965 the faculty section explains the hierarchy. In 1970 professors appear in environments and activities. By 1975 documentary sequences show academics teaching, sitting, eating, working, and relaxing. The 1980 Chanticleer no longer gives Faculty, Administration, or Academics their old formal categories in the table of contents.

When Academics reappears in 1990, the editorial object is the intellectual personality. By 2000, it becomes the stylized academic personality. The 2000 Chanticleer photographs Jairo Moreno through a mirror, George Gopen holding a book, Steve Nowicki juggling outdoors, the Nightingales together among flowering branches, and Michael Montague-Smith leaning against a work surface in jeans.

The 2000 clothing results are another warning against fitting a smooth decline. Three of eight profiles wear conventional ties, a rebound from 1990. Formal clothing survives and can return.

The ranks also damage the simple status theory. Jairo Moreno is an assistant professor and wears no tie or jacket. David W. Johnson is an instructor and wears a tie. Steve Nowicki is an endowed associate professor and appears in a sweatshirt while juggling. George Gopen and Richard Stubbing, both carrying professor-level practice titles, wear jackets and ties.

Women entered this transformation under different conditions. Stanford supplies a perfect sentence. When Myra Strober arrived in 1972 as one of the Graduate School of Business’s first women professors, Stanford was simultaneously hiring pioneering women in law and engineering. The university arranged a press conference to display these new appointments. Strober asked Stanford Law School’s first woman professor, Barbara Babcock, what they should wear. Babcock replied, “Myra, we are the dress code.”

Male professors inherited a costume that could be accepted, rejected, mocked, or neglected. The first woman in a department was helping invent what a woman professor looked like. Dressing like the men could establish seriousness while also emphasizing that authority remained coded male. Rejecting professional clothes could identify her with the new academic culture while exposing her to a judgment the radical man could more easily survive. Stanford’s history recalls that when Strober arrived at the business school in 1972, she could barely find a women’s restroom.

In January 1995, Black law professor John Calmore appeared on an Association of American Law Schools panel immediately after Duncan Kennedy. Kennedy was wearing tattered dark jeans, a faded flannel shirt, and a battered leather jacket. Calmore was beautifully dressed in a suit with a silk tie. Calmore joked that he hoped someday to be able to dress like Kennedy. He then explained the joke. As a Black man traveling through airports, hotels, and cities, he felt he had to dress up to reduce the hassles attached to being read first as a Black man and only later, if at all, as a professor. Even then he had trouble getting taxis. Robert Chang and Adrienne Davis preserved the episode in their Harvard Journal of Law & Gender article “Making Up Is Hard to Do: Race/Gender/Sexual Orientation in the Law School Classroom.”

A 1994 New Yorker profile described Cornel West in his habitual navy three-piece suit, white shirt, tie, watch chain, and cufflinks. West explicitly connected the costume to W. E. B. Du Bois, whose Victorian three-piece suit he saw as dignifying the intellectual vocation, and to the Black preaching tradition’s ideals of “excellence, elegance, and dignity.”

A secure academic can sometimes move downward from the norm, like Kennedy in jeans, upward from it, like West in a three-piece suit, or sideways from it, like the fashion-conscious academics of the 1990s. What status buys is the right to deviate without having the deviation automatically interpreted as evidence of incompetence.

The 1990s made this visible because academia developed both a strong anti-fashion norm and a small fashion avant-garde. In 1991 NYU cultural-studies professor Andrew Ross appeared at the MLA convention in a Comme des Garçons jacket, a Japanese hand-painted tie, earrings, and wedge-heeled suede shoes. Ross said the designer jacket was a send-up of the academic male convention of yellow polyester. By 1997 Princeton literary critic Elaine Showalter could publish an essay in Vogue titled “The Professor Wore Prada,” asking whether a feminist intellectual was allowed to enjoy fashion at all.

A superb 1998 Chronicle of Higher Education article, “Frumpy or Chic? Tweed or Kente? Sometimes Clothes Make the Professor,” caught academics explaining these codes while they were still alive.Wayne Koestenbaum talked about the “semiotic codes” of dress, hair, and makeup and connected his own appearance with changes in his intellectual allegiances. Physicists described pride in dressing down. Emily Toth said academic frumpiness could demonstrate devotion to the life of the mind. Nancy K. Miller observed the brutal asymmetry between candidates and incumbents. Scholars hunting for jobs were expected to look much better than scholars who already had one. The article opens with a hiring committee spending ten minutes discussing a candidate’s green polyester pants.

While the tenured professor could make not caring about clothes into a sign of seriousness, the candidate could lose a job because his trousers sent the wrong message.

Experimental psychology eventually caught up with what the professors were doing. Silvia Bellezza, Francesca Gino, and Anat Keinan’s 2014 Journal of Consumer Research paper “The Red Sneakers Effect: Inferring Status and Competence from Signals of Nonconformity” showed that deliberate violations of dress norms can increase perceived status and competence. The mechanism was perceived autonomy. Someone who visibly knows the rule and chooses to break it can look more powerful because observers infer that he can afford the social cost.

Nonconformity works when observers recognize the norm and interpret the violation as intentional. If they think the person simply does not know how to dress, the signal changes. The famous professor in sneakers can look autonomous. The nervous job candidate who arrives at the wrong interview in sneakers can look clueless.

Bellezza, Gino, and Keinan began from the observation that accomplished professors at professional meetings often dressed less conventionally than students and junior scholars. Their academic evidence found an association between research accomplishment and informal dress. Success provides independent evidence of competence. Once the CV speaks loudly enough, the tie can stop speaking.

Damon Phillips and Ezra Zuckerman’s 2001 American Journal of Sociology article “Middle-Status Conformity” argues that conformity can follow an inverted U. The people at the top have enough security to violate norms. People at the bottom may have little membership to protect. People in the middle often conform most because they have achieved enough status to value their position but not enough to treat it casually.

Applied to a university, that predicts that the most conventionally dressed person may be the assistant professor on the tenure clock, the visiting professor hoping to stay, or the candidate giving the job talk.

The Duke experiment complicates that prediction. Its 2000 Chanticleer lower-title faculty were more casual than the higher-title group. In 1975 the rank cases also scatter. Victor Strandberg, an associate professor with tenure, appears in jacket and tie with longer hair. Arif Dirlik, then an assistant professor, appears formally dressed. Janis Antonovics appears in a T-shirt. Academic rank alone fails to order them.

Matteo Prato, Emmanuel Kypraios, Gokhan Ertug, and Yonghoon Lee’s Academy of Management Journal paper “Middle-Status Conformity Revisited: The Interplay between Achieved and Ascribed Status” distinguishes status one earns inside a field from status attached to social categories before individual achievement is considered.

An academic may possess tenure, publications, reputation, and institutional rank while still receiving weaker presumptions of authority from strangers.

Mara Aruguete, Joshua Slater, and Sekela Mwaikinda randomly showed students otherwise equivalent Black and white professors in formal or casual clothing. Their 2017 Journal of Negro Education paper, “The Effects of Professors’ Race and Clothing Style on Student Evaluations,” found that students trusted the Black professor more when he was formally dressed. For the white professor the effect reversed. Casual clothing increased trust.

The same clothes were doing opposite work because they landed on different bodies. If observers grant unequal presumptions of authority, conventional dress can operate as compensatory evidence. Informality becomes cheaper for the person whose competence is already presumed.

Beverly Yuen Thompson found the same structure in interviews. Her Fashion Theory article “Academ-Ink: University Faculty Fashion and Its Discontents” describes a university stretching from power-suit administrators to professors in activist T-shirts. Faculty generally enjoyed considerable latitude, but straight white male professors received the greatest latitude. Academics with more marginalized identities reported greater pressure to conform to conservative expectations of professional dress.

A member of a group whose authority is readily presumed can use casualness to buy warmth, authenticity, eccentricity, or anti-corporate distinction. Someone whose competence is already being tested may need the clothes to continue supplying evidence.

Sebastian Oliver and colleagues conducted three experiments involving 1,361 participants. Their Assessment & Evaluation in Higher Education paper “Fitted: The Impact of Academics’ Attire on Students’ Evaluations and Intentions” found that formal academic dress increased perceptions of competence but reduced perceptions of warmth. Casual dress did the reverse. Other information about the professor’s success and the norms of the discipline could reduce the competence penalty attached to informality.

Formal clothing supplies authority when authority remains uncertain. Informal clothing can spend authority that has already been established.

The Duke evidence adds another proposition. Formal clothing also supplies institutional office. The 1970 administrator comparison is stronger than the rank comparison because it occurs inside a single yearbook. Nine of nine senior administrators with observable neckwear wear ties. Ten of ten wear jackets. Selected academics in the same volume have already broken away from the code.

The person representing Duke as president remains tied to formal professional dress. The person representing himself as zoologist, historian, engineer, or teacher has more room.

By the 2010 Chanticleer, even the category “Faculty Spotlights” has become unstable. Its four featured people include a James B. Duke Professor, an associate university archivist, a counseling-center administrator, and a center director with faculty affiliations. The questions concern family, restaurants, hobbies, exercise, student advice, and surprising personal facts.

The editorial category has migrated from faculty as institutional class toward interesting adults associated with university life.

That change recalls Richard Sennett’s argument in The Fall of Public Man. Public roles depend on conventions that let strangers recognize a social position before knowing the individual occupying it. Clothing can provide one of those conventions. As personality becomes more culturally important, attention moves from office toward person.

Duke’s yearbooks perform that movement visually. In 1965 the category is department chairman. In 1970 it is selected academic adult. In 1975 it becomes teacher, scholar, personality, environment, and activity. In 1990 professors speak as intellectual selves. In 2000 they are stylized. In 2010 the boundary between professor and interesting university adult becomes porous.

Corporate America was becoming more casual too. In 1992 Dockers mailed its “Guide to Casual Business Wear” to roughly 25,000 human-resources managers. Levi Strauss cites surveys showing that the proportion of companies allowing some casual dress rose from about two-thirds in 1992 to nine in ten by 1995. Khakis and open collars ceased to distinguish the professor from the managerial world as effectively as they once had.

Professors, scientists, engineers, architects, and artists had been cultivating forms of occupational informality long before the tech billionaire in a T-shirt became a cliché. Silicon Valley detached casual dress from low income. By the 2000s a fleece, sneaker, open collar, or quarter-zip could belong to someone richer than everyone in the room. Informality could mean that the wearer was so secure that conventional displays of money and authority had become unnecessary.

That destroyed another old academic distinction. The 1950s professor could reject the businessman partly by dressing like a learned man of modest income. The contemporary millionaire technologist could wear clothes that looked more casual and less expensive than the professor’s.

Price and formality separated. Price and visible status separated too. Cashmere, minimalist shoes, unbranded knitwear, technical outerwear, and expensive garments designed to hide expense allow affluence to coexist with anti-display.

Academic anti-fashion therefore became harder to interpret. Frumpiness could signal devotion to scholarship. A designer jacket could signal cultural capital. A three-piece suit could signal conservatism, Black dignity, preaching tradition, aesthetic preference, irony, or eccentricity. Jeans could signal solidarity with students, disciplinary custom, indifference, youth, tenure, comfort, politics, or nothing at all.

In Distinction, Pierre Bourdieu says taste derives meaning from social differences and from mastery of distinctions that appear natural to those who possess the relevant cultural capital. In Homo Academicus, the university itself becomes a field of competing forms of capital. Put the two together and studied neglect becomes legible. Dressing as though one has forgotten the rules can be a display available most safely to someone whose position proves that he knows them.

Development officers, senior managers, outside counsel, recruiters, and consultants inhabit roles in which organizational authority often benefits from remaining externally legible. Faculty possess a different bundle of capital in publications, tenure, disciplinary reputation, grants, prizes, citations, and institutional affiliation. The administrator often benefits from looking like the office. The professor can sometimes benefit from showing that he is not the office.

Tom Wolfe understood the code before social psychologists gave it variables. He observed that intellectuals who look as though they do not care about clothes are often using clothes as carefully as bankers or soldiers do. They are communicating a different status allegiance.

In I Am Charlotte Simmons, the faculty at fictional Dupont University choose deliberately cheap-looking shirts worn open at the throat with uncreased jeans, khakis, or corduroys. The clothes distinguish them from the middle class. Academic anti-fashion functions as fashion because members of the status group learn its meaning.

In his 2006 Jefferson Lecture interview, Wolfe remarked on how rarely writers allowed themselves to be photographed in neckties. The open collar had become a bohemian sign of contempt for convention. Then, as Wolfe put it, “Then it becomes a convention itself.”

He placed the phenomenon in the history of bohemian status competition. Bourgeois artists and intellectuals adopted unconventional clothes, poverty, manners, and sexual styles partly to prevent themselves from being mistaken for the bourgeoisie from which many had come. They were defining themselves against a neighboring status group.

Wolfe noticed the inversion under Communism. Writers in the Czechoslovak Writers’ Union dressed like businessmen. His explanation was simple: “They were on top.” Once the intellectual becomes part of the establishment, businesslike formality can lose its old stigma.

That observation gives us a hypothesis extending beyond Duke. Professorial informality should be strongest when academics understand themselves as culturally prestigious outsiders confronting a commercial, bureaucratic, or political establishment. Where intellectuals understand themselves as the establishment, the meaning of formal clothes can change.

Wolfe’s own white suits performed the reversal. In a literary milieu where casual bohemianism communicated authenticity, he dressed like an exaggerated Southern banker. He called his taste counter-bohemian. The rebel could rebel against rebellion.

His larger claim was that clothing opens a route into status. Brands, shoes, furniture, manners, treatment of superiors and inferiors, and sartorial detail reveal what people expect their place in the world to be. In The Bonfire of the Vanities, he wrote, “You never realize how much of your background is sewn into the lining of your clothes.”

Clothes contain a miniature institutional history.

The Duke study remains one university and one publication. It cannot tell us how American professors as a population dressed in 1965, 1975, or 1990. The changing yearbook formats prevent false precision. Its value lies in making several mechanisms visible enough to test elsewhere.

Berkeley has placed online an extraordinary sequence of portraits of Sather Professors in Classics running from 1913 through the 1990s. Because institution, field, prestige, and photographic purpose remain relatively stable, the series comes close to a natural visual experiment. The early portraits belong unmistakably to the jacket-and-tie world. Later incumbents become progressively more varied. The University of Chicago’s photographic archive is even more useful because images are dated and often classified as formal or informal. In September 1980, for example, political-science chairman Leonard Binder was photographed informally in his office, tieless and open-collared. The photograph does not prove the theory. It shows how easily the theory could be tested.

Harvard holds the material needed for a larger study: faculty portraits from 1909 to 1972, News Office photographs from the 1970s, and Graduate School of Design faculty photographs from 1970 to 1990. Berkeley, Chicago, Princeton, Stanford, Duke, and Yale have overlapping institutional photographic collections.

Take five departments at seven universities. Sample faculty photographs every five years from 1960 onward. Code tie, jacket, matching suit, denim, open collar, knitwear, T-shirt, athletic shoe, beard, tattoo, unusual hair, and identifiable brand where the image genuinely permits it. Record field, rank, administrative office, year, gender, and race from reliable biographical records rather than visual guessing. Most importantly, code photographic setting. A formal publicity portrait, classroom photograph, office candid, commencement photograph, conference appearance, and press conference are not interchangeable. Otherwise the project risks measuring the casualization of university photography instead of the casualization of professors.

Code deans, provosts, presidents, development officers, and senior administrators separately. The Duke experiment now gives a strong reason for doing so. Its best within-year finding is the persistence of formal dress among officeholders while faculty representation diversifies.

The outcome should also move beyond a single casual-to-formal score. Duncan Kennedy in battered jeans and Cornel West in a three-piece suit occupy opposite ends of that scale while sharing a capacity to depart from the local median and remain authoritative.

Measure conventional formality and distance from the expected costume of people in the same institution, field, role, sex, and period. Then ask whether high achievement predicts variance, whether institutional office predicts conventional formality, whether insecure positions predict conformity, and whether the cost of deviation changes by race and gender.

Dearing’s field differences should remain in the model. A physicist, business professor, literary scholar, law professor, engineer, and architect occupy different occupational ecosystems. The relevant norm has always been local.

The Duke findings generate several falsifiable expectations. Conventional academic formality should fall after the 1960s. Ties may decline before jackets. Institutional officeholders should remain closer to contemporary business-professional dress than ordinary faculty. The relationship between academic rank and informality should be weak or nonlinear. Representation should become increasingly environmental, personal, and individualized. Race and gender should modify the credibility cost of deviation. Field should matter substantially.

The direction of elite nonconformity may reverse again. When everyone wears ties, status can be expressed by removing one. When everyone wears hoodies, quarter-zips, sneakers, and open collars, putting the tie back on can become the deviation.

COVID pushed the underlying mechanism to absurd clarity. In 2020 Duke president Vincent Price filmed himself at home wearing a sport coat and shirt, then stood up to reveal khaki Bermuda shorts. “Zoom attire,” he called it.

The joke condenses sixty years of academic clothing. The camera sees the institutional role, so the jacket stays. The unseen lower half escapes the requirement. Context determines which pieces of clothing have work to do.

The professor’s clothes once helped establish the role before the professor spoke. Today the CV, title, institution, publications, reputation, disciplinary standing, web page, awards, and setting can do more of that labor. Clothing becomes freer as authority becomes legible through other channels.

Where those channels are weak or unequally recognized, clothing still works hard.

That is the connection between the Duke department heads, Peter Klopfer, Duncan Kennedy, John Calmore, Cornel West, the assistant professor on the job market, the president on Zoom, and the professor in a T-shirt. Each body arrives with a different amount and kind of authority already credited to it. Dress can supply authority, conserve it, spend it, reject its conventional form, or convert it into another status signal.

The 1950s professor distinguished himself from commerce by looking like a gentleman of modest means. The 1970s professor could distinguish himself from the establishment by looking closer to his students. The 1990s professor could turn frumpiness into intellectual seriousness or designer clothing into cultural capital. The modern professor can use expensive clothes that look inexpensive, formal clothes that look eccentric, or casual clothes that once would have made him indistinguishable from an undergraduate.

The clothes track who possesses authority before getting dressed.

Fifty years ago the jacket and tie could say, “I am the professor, not one of the students.” Today the hoodie can say, “I am the professor, not one of the administrators.” Only some people can make the hoodie say that. For others it may still say student, staff, unserious, young, outsider, or person who wandered into the wrong room.

The Duke yearbooks let us watch the old certainty dissolve. In 1965 the institution presents its academic chiefs through a nearly uniform costume. In 1970 professors begin separating the tie from the role while senior administrators retain it. In 1975 formal and countercultural elements mix freely. By 1990 casual professorial dress no longer asks to be interpreted. By 2000 formal and informal styles coexist as personality. By 2010 “faculty” itself has become an elastic category of university personalities.

The history is therefore larger than professors becoming casual. The common costume of academic authority lost its compulsory force at the same time that universities changed how they represented academic people. Office yielded ground to personality. A single visual code gave way to several legitimate ones.

Some professors kept the old costume. Some discarded parts of it. Some turned excessive formality into individuality. Some adopted anti-fashion. Some bought designer anti-fashion. Administrators stayed closer to professional-business dress. Women and minority professors often faced higher costs for informality. Famous and secure academics could sometimes violate expectations in either direction. Fields maintained their own codes.

The old costume disappeared unevenly because it had carried several kinds of information at once. Gentleman. Adult. Scholar. Professional. Department head. Member of an elite institution. Person entitled to speak. As those meanings separated, their clothes separated too.

The jacket survived the tie. The open collar survived its association with rebellion. The beard moved from deviance to banality. The T-shirt crossed from student life into faculty life. Formality survived as an option and sometimes became more distinctive because it was optional.

Academic freedom in clothing eventually made academic clothing difficult to identify.

American fiction noticed the professor’s clothes long before social scientists began treating dress as a measurable status signal. Novels preserve meanings that photographs cannot. A photograph can tell us that a professor wore a beard, tweed jacket, black suit, or T-shirt. Fiction can tell us what another professor thought the beard meant, why a young academic worried about looking wrong, why a shabby coat could become a moral statement, and how a three-piece suit might cease to mean conformity once almost everybody else had abandoned one.

The literary record also complicates the familiar story in which American professors dressed formally until the 1960s and then discovered casualness. Academic anti-fashion is older. Shabby gentility, tweed eccentricity, cultivated indifference to commercial polish, and the idea that excessive concern with clothes betrayed an insufficiently intellectual mind were already available professorial styles. What happened after the 1960s was an enlargement of the repertoire. Deviations that had once existed inside a highly legible formal system moved toward the center of academic representation. Eventually the system became so permissive that there was no longer one costume from which everyone was deviating.

The Professor’s House, published by Willa Cather in 1925, gives an early version of the distinction between the public professor and the scholar at work. Godfrey St. Peter’s intellectual life is centered in an inconvenient old sewing room. There he can work in clothing chosen for warmth and bodily convenience rather than institutional presentation. Cather even allows us to encounter “the Professor in pyjamas.” The professor as private scholar barely needs a costume. The public university role creates the stronger demand for one.

Professors have always had bodies offstage. The historical question is which parts of that private informality become permissible onstage.

Stoner, published by John Williams in 1965 but set across the first half of the twentieth century, makes academic clothing part of class mobility. William Stoner arrives from a poor Missouri farm and enters a social world for which he has little preparation. He wears the same black broadcloth suit, white shirt, and string tie in every season. Williams describes the clothes as fitting him like a uniform that had belonged to someone else.

That metaphor carries most of the sociology. Stoner has acquired the costume before he has fully acquired the identity. The suit gives him provisional membership in educated life. It is austere rather than luxurious. It distinguishes the scholar from his farming origins without making him look commercial or rich. He is learning how to become a professor partly by inhabiting a form that existed before him.

The old academic suit could facilitate accession. Clothing allowed someone without inherited cultural fluency to enter an institution whose codes he was still learning.

Pnin, published by Vladimir Nabokov in 1957, presents a different imperfect fit. Timofey Pnin wears tweed, flannels, conservative shoes, strange socks, and memorable ties. He is formal and eccentric at once. His clothes carry European manners into an American college environment that he understands imperfectly.

Pnin shows how much variation was already possible inside the jacket-and-tie regime. Formality did not eliminate eccentricity. Indeed, the old code gave eccentricity something against which to register. A ridiculous tie could be ridiculous because everybody understood the ordinary tie. Mismatched details were legible because the general costume remained stable.

Pnin is formally dressed while simultaneously violating taste. The clothes express nationality, generation, displacement, class, professorial identity, and individual oddity. He belongs to the code and fails at it in ways that make him more recognizably himself.

The Groves of Academe, published by Mary McCarthy in 1952, reveals that academic shabbiness could itself communicate moral distinction. Henry Mulcahy’s ill-fitting, impoverished appearance marks his distance from prosperity, worldly advancement, polished administration, and bourgeois success. McCarthy turns neglect into a social manifesto.

This academic type existed well before jeans and student radicalism transformed the campus. The professor who looked indifferent to material presentation could imply that his commitments lay elsewhere. Commercial failure could be translated into intellectual seriousness. Poverty, or the appearance of poverty, could become a status resource inside a culture that distrusted overt commercial ambition.

The professor’s shabby trousers and the banker’s perfect suit belonged to rival moral economies.

Pictures from an Institution, Randall Jarrell’s 1954 academic novel, finds a female counterpart. Jarrell’s professors inhabit a small college where clothing, speech, manner, intellectual allegiance, and social rivalry become readable with extraordinary precision. Female academic dress can already include an anti-glamour repertoire of tweed, sweaters, practical clothes, and deliberate distance from conventional feminine display.

Women entering academic life confronted several incompatible expectations. Academic seriousness could require distance from fashion. Femininity could require attention to it. Professional authority might reward resemblance to male colleagues while penalizing a woman who seemed insufficiently feminine. Fiction recognized the unstable category of “woman intellectual” before universities had settled on any visual convention for it.

The most revealing pre-1960s boundary test may come from A New Life by Bernard Malamud. The novel was published in 1961, but its academic world begins in 1950. S. Levin arrives for a junior teaching position with a beard. A colleague quickly tells him that students may think he is an oddball. Nobody on the faculty wears one. The administration is clean-shaven. Students grow beards. The president’s wife supposedly associates facial hair with radicals.

The scene is almost a miniature theory of academic fashion. It contains rank, institutional conformity, faculty-student differentiation, political coding, grooming, local norms, and reputational risk.

Levin is also new.

That detail is fundamental. The question is not merely whether a beard is permitted. It is whether this person, at this career stage, in this institution, can afford one. A famous senior professor might be eccentric. A new instructor risks looking as though he does not understand where he is.

Malamud therefore anticipated a distinction that later status research would formalize. Deviation has a cost. The cost falls hardest on people whose membership remains uncertain.

The novel also gives useful context to the Duke evidence. In Duke’s 1965 yearbook, beards are absent from the complete Department Heads sample. By 1975 they have become visible among faculty. Malamud’s fictional 1950 institution makes the earlier prohibition intelligible. A beard could collapse distinctions that the university still wanted clothes and grooming to maintain.

Yet McCarthy’s shabby professor reminds us that not every kind of informality was equally threatening. A professor could already look materially unsuccessful while remaining recognizably academic. Facial hair, student resemblance, bourgeois polish, eccentric ties, and shabby clothes occupied different positions in the code.

The 1960s changed academia’s anti-fashion vocabulary and broadened its political meaning. Older academic anti-fashion could say: I care more about ideas than money. The newer repertoire could add: I am closer to students than administrators. I identify with bohemia rather than business. I reject the establishment. I belong to a discipline in which corporate polish would look suspicious. I possess enough academic standing that I no longer need conventional professional clothes to establish seriousness.

That enlarged vocabulary becomes visible in White Noise, Don DeLillo’s 1985 academic novel. DeLillo gives the College-on-the-Hill several sartorial systems at once. Jack Gladney, chairman of Hitler Studies, has deliberately constructed himself. His name, physical bulk, dark glasses, academic role, and clothing contribute to an authored persona. Department heads wear black academic tunics around campus. The robe makes even an ordinary movement theatrical. Institutional office has become literal costume. Across the university, another academic tribe looks completely different. The American Environments faculty wear rumpled clothes, need haircuts, cultivate facial hair, and resemble an occupational subculture with its own anti-professional signals.

DeLillo’s achievement is to show both costumes as costumes. The formally robed chairman and the rumpled cultural-studies professor appear different, yet both participate in systems of academic signification. One exaggerates institutional office. The other performs distance from it. The second style only looks natural because its participants have learned to experience their own conventions as nonconventions.

Thisresembles the empirical result at Duke. In 1970, senior administrators remain overwhelmingly jacketed and tied while selected academic adults have already diversified. Formality adheres more strongly to represented institutional office than to academic identity in general. DeLillo turns that structural difference into satire.

Stoner inhabits a uniform. Pnin mismanages one. Levin negotiates permission to violate one. Gladney designs one.

By the 1980s the professor can increasingly become his own visual editor.

The Secret History, published by Donna Tartt in 1992 and set in the 1980s, reveals what happens when campus casualness has become ordinary enough that formality can become the rebellion.

The strongest clothes belong to Julian Morrow’s students. Henry Winter wears dark English suits and moves through a campus containing hippies, punks, preppies, and other contemporary styles while seeming to inhabit another era. Francis dresses with aristocratic theatricality. Richard Papen studies the group’s appearance because entry into Julian’s seminar means entry into an aesthetic jurisdiction. He changes his own clothes while trying to gain admission.

The reversal is complete. In Malamud, looking too much like a student threatens professorial identity. In Tartt, students can acquire distinction by dressing like an imagined older elite. Old clothes have become countercultural. That is exactly what should happen once a norm reverses. When almost everybody wears ties, removing one can signal independence. Once casualness becomes dominant, wearing a severe dark suit can accomplish the same thing.

Tartt also reminds us that professors can influence clothing without being the most conspicuously dressed people in the room. Julian’s power lies in defining taste. His students reorganize themselves around his conception of beauty, history, learning, exclusivity, and social difference.

The professor can generate a sartorial microculture.

This runs against a simple one-way history in which students innovate and faculty eventually follow. Cultural transmission can move in either direction. High-prestige academic enclaves can teach students how to distinguish themselves from other students.

Straight Man, Richard Russo’s 1997 academic comedy, supplies another correction to the idea that status steadily produces informality. Hank Devereaux encounters the visual memory of his younger self as a writer. The earlier author is shaggy and bearded. The older professor is balding and cleaner-cut.

The direction is the opposite of the easy theory.

Age and professional security have not released Devereaux into ever greater bohemianism. The young writer had stronger incentives to perform literary intensity and outsider identity. The established academic no longer needs that particular costume.

Different kinds of cultural capital reward different appearances. The aspiring novelist may benefit from looking like an artist. The department chair may benefit from looking like someone who can survive a budget meeting. The same person can move between those systems over a career.

The Duke repeated-person cases point in the same direction. Some professors remain formal across years. Some remain casual. George Pearsall changes from tie-wearing dean to open-collar professor. Individual careers do not follow one sartorial law.

Wonder Boys, Michael Chabon’s 1995 novel, gives us the mature version of the disordered creative-writing professor. Grady Tripp’s rumpled appearance belongs to a broader persona of writerly disorder, unfinished work, marijuana, damaged relationships, and institutional indulgence.

His appearance is interesting partly because nobody doubts that he is a professor.

The dishevelment has lost Malamud’s danger. It does not make Tripp look as though he wandered into the faculty by mistake. It helps identify the kind of professor he is.

That is an enormous historical change.

Once an institution contains stable subtypes such as the disheveled novelist, tweedy historian, laboratory scientist, fashion-conscious theorist, suited law professor, fleece-wearing engineer, and power-suited dean, academic dress has moved from a common costume toward a taxonomy of personalities.

Blue Angel, Francine Prose’s 2000 campus novel, pushes the collapse of the old professor-student visual distinction further. Its most conspicuous dresser is the student Angela Argo. Her dyed hair, piercings, leather, chains, and subcultural styling belong to a world in which the old debate about whether a professor may wear a beard feels almost quaint.

The professor no longer has to out-formalize the student to remain legible as faculty. Institutional context, age, title, classroom position, tenure, and social role do the classificatory work.

That is the world Duke reaches by 1990. The open-collar professor requires no explanation because clothing has ceased to bear the full burden of occupational identification.

On Beauty, published by Zadie Smith in 2005, may offer the richest fictional treatment of academic clothing after casualization because it places dress inside ideological, racial, aesthetic, and professional competition.

Monty Kipps, a conservative Black public intellectual, is a three-piece-suit academic. Howard Belsey, his white liberal antagonist, belongs to a different academic culture. Other scholars inhabit their own combinations of professional formality, racial presentation, generational identity, and disciplinary style.

The suit no longer possesses a single meaning. It can communicate conservatism. It can communicate dignity. It can connect a Black intellectual with traditions of clerical or public leadership. It can establish professional authority. It can mark ideological distance from a casually dressed liberal academy. It can also simply fit the occasion.

This is where the formal-casual axis finally becomes inadequate. Duncan Kennedy in battered jeans and Cornel West in a three-piece suit can be opposites in conventional formality while resembling one another in another respect. Each has enough authority to make a conspicuous departure from a local median intelligible as personal style rather than incompetence.

Fiction arrives at the same idea through characters. The important variable is sartorial discretion.

That discretion has several directions. A professor can deviate downward toward shabbiness. He can deviate toward bohemian casualness. She can deviate toward fashion. He can deviate upward toward archaic formality. Someone can deliberately dress more professionally than colleagues because professional dress communicates racial dignity or institutional seriousness. Another can dress less professionally because distance from administration or commerce improves his standing within his academic tribe.

The same deviation can also have different costs on different bodies. That problem sits near the center of The Human Stain by Philip Roth, although clothing is not Roth’s primary instrument. Coleman Silk spends a lifetime controlling how institutions classify him. Professor, dean, Jew, white man, Black man, outsider, insider, authority figure, sexual transgressor, and old man become categories attached to a body that other people repeatedly think they understand.

Roth’s subject is social legibility.

Clothing belongs to the same system as name, voice, skin, accent, manners, credentials, institutional office, and biography. Observers build identities from visible cues, often with enormous confidence and incomplete information. That is why academic fashion cannot be understood apart from race and sex. The freedom to become visually ambiguous depends on the amount of authority an observer grants before the clothes are interpreted.

A professor who is immediately presumed to belong can afford to look unlike a professor. Someone whose membership is doubtful may need the clothes to settle the question early. The fiction therefore suggests another variable beyond formality and sartorial discretion: legibility. Stoner’s suit makes him more legible as an educated man. Pnin’s clothes make him legible as professor while preserving his foreignness and eccentricity. Levin’s beard threatens legibility because it makes faculty and student categories overlap. McCarthy’s shabbiness remains legible because scholarly poverty is already an understood academic type. DeLillo’s robe exaggerates institutional legibility until it becomes comic. Tartt’s formal students deliberately make themselves illegible as ordinary contemporary undergraduates. Grady Tripp’s rumpled clothes identify a recognizable subtype rather than confusing anyone. Coleman Silk’s story reveals how deeply mistaken social legibility can be.

The history of faculty fashion can therefore be read as a history of how much visual ambiguity professors are allowed. In the older university, the professor’s clothes answered the question before he spoke. A suit, tie, haircut, age, posture, office, and institutional setting jointly established the category. Some eccentricity was permitted, but the general grammar remained stable. By the late twentieth century, other signals increasingly carried that information. A classroom, faculty directory, university web page, endowed title, publication record, disciplinary reputation, office door, conference badge, CV, or familiar name could establish authority independently of clothing.

That change creates room for ambiguity. The contemporary professor can sometimes enter looking like a software engineer, preacher, aristocrat, student, artist, consultant, mechanic, activist, novelist, or someone who forgot there was a meeting. Context resolves the classification afterward.

The old academic anti-fashion depended on a visible norm. Mary McCarthy’s shabby professor could make neglect meaningful because respectability remained easy to recognize. Malamud’s beard could shock because the administration remained clean-shaven. Pnin’s bad tie could be funny because a correct tie existed. The unconventional professor depended on convention for his unconventionality.

The post-1960s transformation weakens that background. As more styles become legitimate, deviation becomes harder to locate. A beard loses political force. An open collar loses bohemian force. Jeans lose their student monopoly. T-shirts become ordinary. Even deliberate frumpiness becomes an academic stereotype. Then the signaling game changes again.

Once casualness becomes expected, formality can carry the information previously carried by casualness. Tartt’s students can make suits look rebellious. Zadie Smith can make the three-piece academic ideologically distinctive. Cornel West can turn extreme formality into personal authorship. A young scholar today could conceivably use a tie to distinguish himself from a faculty full of quarter-zips and sneakers.

The direction of nonconformity reverses with the norm. This is why fiction gives access to the meanings surrounding the garments. Photographs tell us what changed. Novels tell us what the changes could mean to people living inside them.

The fictional chronology also helps reinterpret the Duke yearbooks. Duke’s 1965 department heads do not prove that every professor dressed formally. McCarthy and Malamud make that proposition implausible before we even look elsewhere in the yearbook. Duke itself confirms the point when Peter Klopfer appears casually in the Campus Personalities section. The 1965 finding is institutional. When the yearbook wanted to represent departmental authority, it used an extraordinarily narrow visual code. By 1970, the code begins breaking apart. Professors appear in classrooms, outdoors, in offices, and in activity photographs. Ties become optional while senior administrators remain formally dressed. By 1975, the old and new visual languages coexist inside the faculty sequence. Tie with long hair. Jacket with beard. T-shirt in greenhouse. Open collar in office. The individual combinations matter because they show that no replacement costume has taken command. By 1990, casual professorial dress hardly functions as a statement.

That trajectory fits the fiction. Malamud shows a beard threatening junior faculty membership. DeLillo shows departments possessing rival costumes. Tartt shows old formality becoming subcultural distinction. Russo shows that career progression need not mean increasing casualness. Chabon shows academic dishevelment becoming an established character type. Smith shows the suit returning with new racial and ideological meanings.

The novels therefore suggest a revision to the standard history. The professor did not move from fashion to anti-fashion. Academic life contained competing forms of fashion all along. Mid-century academia had a formal institutional code and several tolerated deviations within it. Shabbiness could mean intellectual seriousness. Tweed could mean scholarly vocation. A flamboyant tie could mean eccentricity. A beard could cross the line into dangerous student resemblance. The upheavals after the 1960s expanded the permissible zone. Political identification with students and hostility to commercial or bureaucratic authority gave casualness additional meanings. The occupational costume weakened. Academic subcultures became more visually autonomous. By the end of the century, the direction of deviation mattered less than the capacity to survive it.

Sartorial discretion is the ability to make the observer uncertain about what your clothes mean without making the observer uncertain about whether you belong. The junior professor in Malamud cannot safely do that. The established professor in DeLillo can. The rumpled novelist in Chabon can. The aristocratically dressed classicist in Tartt’s world can. The modern professor who already carries enough recognized authority may be able to let title, reputation, context, or performance resolve whatever ambiguity the clothes introduce. The older professor’s clothes told you who he was before he opened his mouth. The modern professor can sometimes make you wait.

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The Bliss

Some people close to me regularly stun and wound me with their observations that contradict everything I’ve ever shared with them.

If you are close to me and yet you tell me, “Great news, Luke….” and then your great news is something that I experience as bad news, that hurts my feelings. It might even infuriate me.

How could you know me so well and for so long and assume I will experience this news as great? Why do you talk to me as though I am the opposite person than what I really am?

I know a man who has been happy for as long as I have known her. I love his happiness. I love his company. But sometimes, both things drive me up the wall.

He is not happy the way people are happy after good news. He is happy the way weather is warm. It does not depend on what is going on around him. He walks into a room of people who are tired or grieving or furious and he brings the same brightness she brought to the last room, and most of the time the room adjusts to him.

For years I filed this under obtuseness. Some years ago he wrote to me before a party with what he called great news. The great news was that a person I had spent decades telling him I did not like was joining us. Nothing I had said in thirty years supported the word great. He used it anyway, and he meant it. I read the email three times looking for the joke, couldn’t find it, and then I went ballistic for the next 72 hours and then I finally turned sullen for a day. On the fifth day, I got over it.

More recently he told a mate who left school before he could write a paragraph, that he should go get a bachelor’s degree. He said it the way you might suggest a nice restaurant. My mate was left wondering what he had been looking at all these years.

The word I reached for was willful. He must be choosing this. Nobody could miss that much by accident.

Then I asked a better question. What is the payoff?

In Debtors Anonymous they say that debting is a disease of vagueness. The debtor does not know what he owes, does not open the envelope, does not add up the month. The vagueness feels like freedom. The bill comes anyway, but it comes to a person who has spent the intervening weeks lighter than he had any right to be.

That is my friend. He runs a vagueness about other people’s inner states, and the vagueness buys him a bliss that a more attentive person could not afford. If he registered how the man felt about school, he could not hand him a degree like a gift. If he had tracked what I said for thirty years, he could not write great news. The not-registering is the engine. His happiness is real. It is also unfunded.

Who funds it? Everyone within reach. When someone that cheerful misreads you, correcting him feels cruel. You would be the one who brought the cloud. So you swallow it, and he goes on, and the swallowing confirms his reading of the room. He rarely meets the evidence that might puncture the picture, because the people who hold that evidence keep it to themselves out of something like kindness. The loop closes. The bliss gets subsidized by silence.

I was the subsidy for thirty years. I answered the email politely. I did not say, nothing about this is great news to me, and you know that, or you should. I said something like, looking forward to it. And so from his side the party went beautifully.

There is a second payoff, and it took me longer to see. A person who does not spend attention tracking the states of others has a great deal of attention left over. He has done more with his later decades than most people do with their whole lives. I used to think the cheerfulness and the obliviousness were two facts about him. Now I think they are one fact, and that the achievement is a third face of the same thing. Attention is finite. He spends none of it on how you feel, and look what he can build with the surplus.

Willful was the wrong word. Willful means he could look and chooses not to. The man who left school got the same treatment I got, and he had done nothing to earn it. That argues for a setting rather than a grudge. Somewhere far back he stopped spending attention on other people’s weather, and the decision has run so long it no longer feels like one. From the outside, chosen and incapable look identical. The difference determines whether saying it flatly would land or just bounce.

I have not said it. I am not sure I will. I can’t ignore it. I can’t steel myself for it. It still winds me up. I’ll never graduate from this vulnerability.

Believe me, my friend could write a more compelling essay than I have given you about the prices he has paid for my company. A disinterested observer would note that I’ve been the taker in this relationship overall. I tend to be exquisitely sensitive to myself and oblivious to others.

What I owe him is hard to say. Some of the warmth in the rooms he walks into is warmth he made, and I have stood in it and been glad of it. The bill for his happiness was split among the rest of us in small amounts over many years, and most of us paid without noticing. I noticed. That may be my own disease of a different kind, a vagueness about nothing and an accounting of everything.

* I’ve changed some facts in the above for obvious reasons.

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Yale YT Course: Introduction to the Old Testament (Hebrew Bible) (RLST 145) with Christine Hayes

She teaches the way a good trial lawyer opens. Before the jury hears any evidence, she tells them what to distrust, and the thing she asks them to distrust is everything they walked in with. At 16:02 she says that most of our cherished presuppositions about the Bible rest on claims others have made on its behalf, claims the Bible never makes for itself. That sentence tries to disarm the fundamentalist and the village atheist in the same stroke, since both of them argue with a book she says does not exist.

The five myths (it’s a book, it’s pious parables, it’s for children, it’s theology, God wrote it) are the standard critical-scholar liturgy. The best of them is the fourth. She points out at 23:11 that biblical Hebrew has no word for religion, and that becoming an Israelite worked like naturalization: you joined the community, kept its law, revered its lore, and died its death. That is a more useful description of how Judaism still functions than most things said about it from pulpits, and it explains why arguments between Jews and Christians about “belief” so often talk past each other. The catechism model of religion, she says at 23:45, is alien to the Bible.

The frame she opens with is Yehezkel Kaufmann’s. At 1:37 she says the Ancient Near Eastern people with the most lasting legacy was a people that had an idea, and at 5:25 that what counted was less the number of gods than that this God stood outside and above nature.

Hayes says: “This people that had an idea. It was a new idea that broke with the ideas of its neighbors, and those people were the Israelites.”

The line comes from Yehezkel Kaufmann. Hayes assigns him for the second week, and her opening is a paraphrase of his opening. Kaufmann was a Ukrainian-born Zionist who taught at the Hebrew University and wrote an eight-volume history of Israelite religion between 1937 and 1956, which Moshe Greenberg abridged into English in 1960 as The Religion of Israel. His target was Julius Wellhausen. Wellhausen’s Prolegomena (1878) told an evolutionary story: Israel began as a tribal polytheist people like its neighbors, the eighth-century prophets invented ethical monotheism, and the priestly law came last, in the exile, as a fossilization of prophetic spirit. Kaufmann inverted almost every piece of that. Monotheism came first, as an original intuition at the founding of the nation; the prophets applied it; the priestly law was old and pre-exilic. The idea did not evolve out of paganism. It broke with paganism at the start.

His argument was less about God’s number than about God’s nature, which is why Hayes says at 5:25 that number counted for less than that this God stood outside nature. Pagan gods, in Kaufmann’s account, are born, have parents, marry, die, eat, and answer to something above themselves, a fate or a primordial realm that magic can manipulate. The biblical God has no biography and no superior. There is no theogony in Genesis. Nobody coerces Him with a spell. Kaufmann’s cleverest piece of evidence was an argument from absence. The Bible’s polemic against idolatry treats idols as wood and stone, fetishes with eyes that do not see. It never engages the mythology that the idols represented. Kaufmann took that as proof that the writers had lost contact with real pagan thought so long before that they no longer understood it. A people still tempted by Baal’s story would have argued with the story. These writers mocked the statue.

Henri Frankfort’s group at Chicago made a parallel argument in The Intellectual Adventure of Ancient Man (1946), later republished as Before Philosophy, whose closing chapter describes the Hebrews’ “emancipation of thought from myth.” Hayes’s phrase about a god known through history rather than nature comes from that tradition too. Behind both stands the nineteenth-century notion of ethical monotheism as Israel’s gift to the world, which Reform Judaism used to justify its own existence and which Kaufmann, a secularist, nationalized: the idea as the creation and property of a people. That is why the sentence says a people had an idea. The grammar is Zionist.

The last fifty years have gone hard against him on the history. In 1975 and 1976 excavators at Kuntillet Ajrud in the Sinai found eighth-century inscriptions with blessings “by Yahweh of Samaria and his Asherah,” and a tomb at Khirbet el-Qom near Hebron gave a similar line. Hundreds of small clay pillar figurines of a woman holding her breasts turn up in Judahite houses from the same period. Mark S. Smith’s The Early History of God (1990) and The Origins of Biblical Monotheism (2001) laid out the case that now dominates the field: Israel’s God started as a member of the Canaanite pantheon, absorbed the high god El’s traits, then displaced Baal and Asherah over centuries, and the flat statement that no other god exists first appears in the exilic chapters of Isaiah. The Bible keeps fossils of the older picture. Psalm 82 has God standing in a council of gods and sentencing them to death. Deuteronomy 32:8, in the reading preserved at Qumran and in the Greek, has the Most High dividing the nations among the sons of God, with Israel as Yahweh’s share. Kaufmann read those as dead metaphors. Smith reads them as memory.

Morton Smith gave the sociology in Palestinian Parties and Politics That Shaped the Old Testament (1971). A “Yahweh-alone party” existed for centuries as a minority faction, sometimes in power under kings like Hezekiah and Josiah and often not, and it won for good in the exile because its members were the ones who wrote and edited the surviving texts. On that account the idea did not save the people. A party that held the idea captured the archive, and the archive then told the people that the idea had saved them. Hayes concedes the substance of this at 5:10 when she says the Israelites shared the pagan worldview early and that “some Israelites, not all at once and not unanimously,” broke with it. That sentence and Kaufmann’s cannot both be the story. She teaches the first in the body of the course and uses the second for her opening.

Kaufmann’s argument from absence has also been turned around. Ezekiel describes women weeping for Tammuz at the Temple gate. Jeremiah’s opponents tell him things went well when they baked cakes for the Queen of Heaven. Psalm 29 is a Baal hymn with the name changed, and the sea monster Leviathan and the sea itself as an enemy appear throughout the poetry in ways that match the Ugaritic tablets found at Ras Shamra after 1929. The writers knew the myths. Calling idols wood and stone was polemic, and polemic is a sign of contact, since nobody argues with a corpse. Benjamin Sommer’s The Bodies of God and the World of Ancient Israel (2009) went after the transcendence claim from another side, showing that in the older strands God has a body, appears in several places at once, and walks in gardens and eats with Abraham. The God outside nature is the priestly and Deuteronomic God, and the Torah’s editors let the other one stand beside Him.

Akhenaten worshipped the sun disk alone in the fourteenth century, a generation or two before any plausible Moses, and Freud built Moses and Monotheism on the coincidence. Babylonian scribes wrote hymns that made Marduk the sum of all the other gods. Xenophanes in sixth-century Greece mocked gods with human bodies and posited one god unlike mortals in form or thought. None of those became a surviving religion, which is Kaufmann’s real point and Hayes’s: the idea alone counts for little, and the Israelites made a people out of it. Jan Assmann, in Moses the Egyptian (1997) and The Price of Monotheism (2003), accepts that something new happened but locates it elsewhere. The novelty is what he calls the Mosaic distinction, the split between true religion and false, which pagan religions did not have since their gods were translatable across borders. Zeus was Jupiter was Amun. Yahweh had no translation. Assmann thinks that distinction gave the West its notion of religious truth and also its habit of religious violence, and that Kaufmann’s admiring account skips the bill.

Then there is the causal claim, that the idea ensured survival. The Bible’s own answer to why Judah outlived Babylon has more to do with practice than doctrine, which fits what Hayes says later in the same hour about religion as naturalization. Circumcision, Sabbath, food laws, and endogamy are boundary markers that work in a foreign city without a temple, and Deuteronomy’s centralization of sacrifice in Jerusalem had already made worship a matter of one place rather than every hilltop, so losing the one place hurt without dissolving the pattern of daily life. The deportees went as an elite in a body and were resettled together on the Chebar canal, where they could keep a scribal class alive. Fifty years later Cyrus let them go home and Persia funded the rebuilding. Ezra then imported the book. Every one of those factors could have happened to a people with a different idea, and the northern tribes with the same God and the Samaritans with the same Torah show that the idea by itself guaranteed nothing. And the survival that matters to Hayes’s students is the survival past 70 CE, which the rabbis engineered by turning a temple religion into a text religion, an invention the Bible does not contain.

By the exile, a group of Judahites held a picture of God with no rivals, no biography, and no dependence on nature, and they wrote it into a text and a legal code that a small people could carry through the loss of its state. Nobody else did that, and the results are still with us. The strong version, that the idea appeared whole at the beginning and explains the nation, is the thing Hayes calls overstated at 42:09. She opens with it anyway because it is a better first sentence than the truth, and because it lets the students feel they are studying a revolution instead of a slow argument among Iron Age priests.

This rhetoric reminds of the “America is an idea” crowd. They are the same move made by different parties for different purposes. Both claims take a people whose existence has ordinary causes, land, kin, war, luck, law, a scribal class, and say the decisive thing about them was a proposition. Both come from writers. Kaufmann was a scholar. The American version runs from Lincoln, a lawyer who read all night, through G.K. Chesterton’s line that America is a nation with the soul of a church, through Gunnar Myrdal’s “American Creed” in 1944, through Richard Hofstadter’s remark that it has been America’s fate to have no ideologies but to be one, down to every speechwriter since. Max Weber said it a century ago: intellectuals are the bearers of ideas by trade, and the history they write assigns the causal role to the thing they produce. A blacksmith would tell you the plow made the nation. The man who writes for a living tells you the idea did.

Ideas can be taught, and a people defined by an idea can be handed to the people who teach. Ideas can be violated, which means the people who hold them can indict the nation in its own name. The prophets did that to Israel and Lincoln did it to the Union. The idea is a standard held over reality, and a standard has to be somewhat at war with reality or it is useless.

Now the contrasts. Kaufmann’s idea belongs to a people. His whole point was that the Israelite folk possessed monotheism as a national intuition, present from the start, and the Bible agrees with him in this at least: Israel is Abraham’s seed before it is anything, and the covenant binds a family. Blood and idea come together. The idea does not travel; you join the people by naturalization, as Hayes put it, and the people keep the idea. Assmann’s Mosaic distinction between true and false religion is a wall, and the wall is the point.

The American version runs the other way. The idea owns the people. Anyone who assents can belong, which is why the claim has always been most useful to immigrants and their children and to the coalitions that want more of them. Myrdal was a Swede. Many of the loudest twentieth-century voices for the creed were Jews, Catholics, and their descendants, for whom the alternative account, Samuel Huntington’s Anglo-Protestant settler culture with a creed as its by-product, meant standing outside. Huntington’s Who Are We? (2004) is the Mark Smith of this argument: the idea came late, from a specific people with a specific religion and language, and it survived because that people’s institutions carried it. John Jay in Federalist No. 2described the Americans as one people descended from the same ancestors, speaking the same language, professing the same religion. That is a Kaufmann sentence about America. It is now unsayable in the same rooms where “America is an idea” is applause.

So the two claims serve opposite coalitions. Kaufmann’s serves a nation that wants to be a nation, which is why a secular Zionist wrote it. The American creed serves a state that wants to be a church, open to converts. And each has a mirror in the other’s tradition. Kaufmann’s frame descends from Reform Judaism’s ethical monotheism, which German Jews in the nineteenth century used to argue that Judaism was an idea any modern man could respect and therefore its holders could be citizens. That is the American creed in Jewish dress. And the American creed has its own tribalists, who say the idea was English and Protestant and note how many of its proponents are recent arrivals. That is Kaufmann in American dress.

Both claims get contradicted the same way, by digging. Kuntillet Ajrud and the pillar figurines show the Israelites worshipping a goddess two centuries after the supposed intuition. The American equivalent is any county history: the country ran on land, slaves, oceans, coal, and common law, and the idea got quoted at dinners. Both claims also carry the same cost, which Assmann named for monotheism. Once a people is an idea, disagreeing with the idea makes you not part of the people. Israel has its idolaters and America has its un-Americans, and each word does work that “foreigner” cannot.

Ideas are part of reality. Deuteronomy’s demand for one sanctuary, an idea, made the loss of that sanctuary survivable in a way it could not have been for a hill-shrine religion. The Declaration’s sentence about equality, an idea, gave Frederick Douglass and King a weapon they used to change facts on the ground. Ideas act when a people carries them, and a people gets carried by institutions and kin and land. The intellectuals cut the second half because the second half is where they stop being needed. The realists cut the first half because they distrust the people who make the first half their living.

Hayes then assigns Kaufmann for next week and tells students at 42:09 that his ideas are important but overstated. So she borrows his thesis for her own opening and flags the loan as inflated in the same hour. The thesis that an idea saved Israel is a theologian’s causal story. A historian might point to the Babylonians deporting the Judahite scribal and priestly elite as a body and settling them together, which preserved the people who could write, and to the Persian policy of return, which gave them somewhere to write from. Ideas need carriers. The northern tribes had the same God and vanished. She half concedes this at 3:16 when she says the north was lost “to a large degree,” and the Samaritans, who kept the Torah and are still around, get no mention at all. Her line at 3:30 that the Israelites alone emerged after the death of their state is the kind of sentence one says to open a course, not to close one.

Her flood comparison is the strongest ten minutes. She lists the shared narrative elements of Ziusudra and Noah at 11:31 and then makes the point that the borrowing is less important than the rewriting: the Mesopotamian gods drown mankind because the noise keeps them awake, and the biblical God does it out of moral outrage at creatures He made and loves. “It’s saying something different,” she says at 12:54. That is the method of the course in miniature. Read the parallel, then read the deviation, and the deviation is where the writer’s values live. It also quietly reframes the whole question of originality. The Israelites did not invent the flood. They invented the reason for it.

In the passage on faith in the room, 27:41 to 29:31, she says no one in the course wishes to undermine religious faith, then says that when a student asks a question driven by an article of faith, she will invite him to consider the article of faith producing the problem, and will not debate its merits. That is a fair rule and it is also an asymmetric one. The critical method gets to be the floor everyone stands on; the believer’s premise gets treated as a symptom to be examined. She is right that this is the only common ground a Yale lecture hall can have. She is also softer than the truth when she says the course does not undermine faith. The source-critical account of the Pentateuch does undermine some faith positions, the literalist ones, and she knows it, which is why she says at 26:50 that there is no basic incompatibility between believing in inspiration and acknowledging human editing. That sentence is true for many believers and false for others, and she leaves the second group to find that out on their own.

Two things date the lecture to 2006 and to Yale. The first is the sales pitch: at 14:47 she says we tend to think of the Bible as an old fuddy-duddy document, and promises it is instead a revolutionary cultural critique. A professor in a secular elite college has to make the Bible sound like dissent to get the room to lean in, and she does. The second is her taste. Job is “possibly the greatest book of the Bible” (18:31), Ecclesiastes “reads like an existentialist writing from the twentieth century” (18:13). Those are the two books a modern skeptic with a literary education loves, and they are the two she promotes. Leviticus gets one clause about holiness. That is a preference, and it shapes what a million viewers now think the Bible is about.

She also gets a few things loose in a way that live lecturing produces. The Dead Sea Scrolls site as maybe “a pottery factory or something” (39:06) is a hedge on a scholarly dispute she does not want to spend time on, and she is right that Esther is the one book missing from Qumran. The claim at 21:34 that she will not let her twelve-year-old and eight-year-old read the Bible is a good laugh line and also a serious claim about the text: incest, rape, murder, and characters who deceive and repent. Her point that the Bible rarely moralizes and leaves the reader to draw conclusions (22:24) is correct and is the strongest argument for reading it as literature rather than as instruction.

What the lecture is, in the end, is an argument that the Bible is a human anthology of dissenting voices that later Jews chose to bind together without reconciling, and that the reader should not reconcile them either (19:04). That is the modern academic consensus, delivered with charm. What it is not is neutral. It is a tradition of its own, going back through Kaufmann and Wellhausen, and it has its own articles of faith, the chief one being that a text with many authors and many voices is more alive than a text with one. She does not invite the students to consider that premise. Nobody teaching from inside a tradition ever does.

Her stated thesis is Kaufmann’s: an idea saved a people. Her best ten minutes, 23:11 to 24:37, say the opposite. Biblical Hebrew has no word for religion; nobody joined Israel by assenting to doctrines; you joined by living an Israelite life and dying an Israelite death; the process was naturalization. That is Mearsheimer’s anthropology stated by a Bible scholar. People are born into groups that form them before they can reason, and the group’s code is imposed before the child can weigh it. If he is right, then the second passage describes the engine and the first passage describes the paint. The idea did not save Judah. A group with hard boundaries and a long apprenticeship saved Judah, and the idea was the group’s flag.

Deuteronomy reads like his theory written as law. Chapter 6 tells the father to teach these words to his children when he sits at home and walks on the road and lies down and rises, to bind them on his hand and write them on his doorposts. Chapter 11 repeats it. Passover is built around a child asking a question and receiving a scripted answer. None of that is an argument for monotheism. It is a schedule for socialization, and it targets the years Mearsheimer says count, the long childhood before the critical faculties arrive. Kaufmann’s own strongest evidence points the same way. He argued that the biblical writers no longer understood paganism, which he took as proof the idea was ancient. On Mearsheimer’s account it proves the idea was inherited rather than reasoned. The writers mocked idols as wood and stone because they had been raised to, and a taught contempt does not need to understand its object.

This also settles the question of what the idea was. Hayes stresses content, a God above nature, known through history. Mearsheimer would stress function. A God who has no translation into Marduk or Baal, who forbids marrying the neighbors’ daughters and eating their food and resting on their days, is a boundary. The content could have been almost anything so long as it was exclusive. That is why the northern tribes, who had the same God, vanished. They lacked the priestly and Deuteronomic apparatus that turned the God into a fence, and they were scattered by the Assyrians in ways that broke the fence anyway. And it is why the Samaritans, who kept the Torah and the fence, are still on Mount Gerizim.

Hayes tells students at 29:05 that when a question comes from a prior commitment to an article of faith, she will invite them to consider the article of faith producing the problem and leave them to think about it. The premise is that faith is socialization and criticism is reason. Mearsheimer denies the distinction. Reason is the least of the three sources of our preferences, and the critical method is a value infusion too, administered by an institution to eighteen-year-olds who arrived with one set of loyalties and will leave with another. The teaching fellows, the sections, the exegesis paper worth a large share of the grade, the warning at 45:22 that missed sections will be punished: that is a naturalization process. Hayes gives the students an Israelite account of how one joins a people and then runs one on them without naming it. Her own description fits her own lecture hall.

He adds something to her reading of the text as well. At 22:24 she says the Bible rarely moralizes, puts people in situations, and leaves conclusions to the reader. At 8:01 she calls its picture of man as a moral agent revolutionary. That is a liberal reader’s Bible, the individual before the page drawing his own conclusions, and it describes how a Yale seminar reads the book. It does not describe how the people the book made encountered it, which was by chant, on a fixed cycle, in a community, under law, with the conclusions supplied by the sages. The moral agent of the Hebrew Bible is corporate more often than individual. Achan sins and his household dies. The nation goes into exile for the sins of the kings. The prophets address Israel in the second person singular because Israel is one body. Hayes says at 24:37 that the narrative is the odyssey of a people, which is the Mearsheimer sentence, and then at 18:25 praises the Psalms for their individual piety, which is the liberal one.

The link back to “America is an idea” tightens. Mearsheimer’s book argues that nationalism beats liberalism whenever the two collide because nationalism fits how people are built and liberalism does not. The Hebrew Bible on his reading is the earliest surviving record of that outcome. A universal God, above nature, the same for everyone, chooses one people and gives them a land and a law, and the particular half of that arrangement is what survived. Hayes’s students hear the universal half called revolutionary. The tribal half is what they are being asked to buy the Jewish Study Bible to read.

David Pinsof’s target is the intellectual who believes the world’s problems are misunderstandings and that his job is to correct them. Hayes’s second chapter is titled “Common Myths about the Bible.” She spends thirteen minutes crossing items off a list, and at 15:54 she says what we have are popular misconceptions that come from how the Bible has been used or misused. That is the genre he is describing. The lecture presents itself as a cure for error, and on his account the first question to ask about any such cure is who profits from the error and who profits from the cure.

Take the myths one at a time. The belief that God wrote the Bible, which Hayes dates at 25:54 to a religious doctrine of a much later age, is held by people whose institutions run on it. A text with one divine author cannot be edited by a professor; a text with many human authors can. The pious-parable reading she mocks at 19:49, the Sunday school version where Jacob is a role model, is a socialization tool that churches use because it works on eight-year-olds. The fuddy-duddy view she names at 14:47, where the Bible is an outdated document, serves the secular student who wants a license to skip it. On Pinsof’s reading none of these are misunderstandings. Each is a belief its holder has an incentive to hold, and the people who hold them are not waiting to be corrected. They are defending an asset.

Hayes says at 27:24 that the course concerns culture, history, literature, and thought rather than faith, and at 28:08 that no one wishes to undermine belief. Those are stated motives. Pinsof’s method is to ask what the enterprise does regardless of what it says. What a university Bible course does is move authority over the text from clergy to professors. The student who finishes it cites Kaufmann and the Jewish Study Bible where he used to cite his pastor or rabbi, and the people who wrote the Jewish Study Bible’s articles are Hayes’s colleagues. The exegesis paper and the sections that carry a quarter of the grade train the student in the academy’s method and no other. That is coalition work, and it is savvy. It does not require anyone to have lied.

Her rule for faith questions at 29:05 fits his template. When a student asks something driven by a prior commitment, she will point out the article of faith producing the problem and decline to debate it. She treats the question as a misunderstanding the student has not noticed in himself. Pinsof would say the student knows what he is doing. He is displaying loyalty to a group whose good opinion he needs more than hers, and the question is a flag, not a confusion. And her refusal to argue the merits is savvy in turn, since an argument on the merits would put the academy’s own premises on the table, and those premises are no more the product of pure reason than the student’s.

Hayes describes the biblical writers at 14:31 as voicing discontent with their culture and at 15:01 as authors of a revolutionary critique. That is the misunderstanding story applied to the Iron Age: Israel’s neighbors and most Israelites held wrong beliefs about God, and a few writers set them straight. Pinsof’s question is what the writers were competing for. The answer in the text is the state and the sanctuary. Josiah’s reform in 2 Kings 23 tears down the rural shrines, slaughters their priests, and routes every sacrifice and its revenue through Jerusalem. Deuteronomy’s one-sanctuary law is the charter for that seizure. The prophets’ denunciations of idolatry are attacks on a rival priesthood’s clientele, and the polemic that calls idols wood and stone, which Kaufmann took as innocent ignorance, is the kind of strategic stupidity Pinsof means. The Yahweh-alone party understood Baal fine. Misdescribing him was a weapon. So the idea that saved Israel was a faction’s flag in a zero-sum fight over the coercive apparatus of a small kingdom, and it survived because the faction that held it also held the archive.

The Bible’s own anthropology is on his side, not hers. Hayes says at 22:24 that the text rarely moralizes and leaves conclusions to the reader, as if the book trusted men to reason their way to the good. The book does not trust them. Jeremiah 17:9 calls the heart deceitful above all things. Deuteronomy’s answer to wrong belief is a law backed by stoning, and its answer to the next generation is drilling, not persuasion. The prophets diagnose a stiff neck and a hard heart, which are motives, and they rarely diagnose a bad argument. The Hebrew Bible reads like a document written by people who had reached Pinsof’s conclusion that the problem is bad motives and had decided the only remedy was force and ritual. The misunderstanding model is later, Greek, and academic, and Hayes imports it into a text that argues against it.

Her favorite books tell the same story. At 18:31 she names Job as possibly the greatest, and at 18:13 she says Ecclesiastes reads like twentieth-century existentialism. Those are the two books that say the world cannot be fixed and the wise man should stop pretending. Pinsof ends his essay with a hole that cannot be climbed out of. He has written a gloss on Ecclesiastes, and the professor who thrills to Ecclesiastes and Pinsof are sharing a taste that a lecture hall full of undergraduates does not, which is one reason Hayes calls the book a fun surprise and one reason his blog is called depressing.

Stanley Fish’s claim in Is There a Text in This Class? (1980) is that a text has no meaning apart from the interpretive strategies readers bring to it, and that those strategies belong to communities, which is why readings are stable within a group and vary between groups. Meaning is what a community trained a certain way sees. Put that beside Hayes’s sentence at 29:21 about helping students read “what the text is actually and not ideally saying,” and the lecture turns into an example of the thing Fish spent a career denying: that under the readings there is a text that says something on its own.

Her list of myths becomes, on his account, a list of other communities’ reading conventions. Churches and synagogues read the Bible as one book because they read with rules that make it one: harmonize the contradictions, read Genesis in light of Exodus, read the Old in light of the New. Fish’s own example in the book is Augustine’s rule in On Christian Doctrine that any passage which does not teach charity must be read figuratively until it does, a rule under which the text can only ever mean charity and the reader never meets a counterexample. Source critics read with a different rule: treat contradictions as seams, assign them to authors, refuse to harmonize. Under that rule the text can only ever be a library. Hayes states her community’s rule at 19:04. The editors “didn’t strive to reconcile the conflicts, nor should we.” The cacophony of voices she promises at 14:25 is what that rule produces. A community that reconciles hears a chorus. Neither sound is in the text. Both are in the ear.

The same holds for the question of what the Bible is. Hayes says at 33:20 that any course runs into the problem of defining its object because different Bibles served different communities, which is Fish’s thesis in her own mouth. Then she resolves it by taking the twenty-four books common to all Bibles as a neutral floor, and at 38:00 concedes that the floor is the Jewish Tanakh. She prefers “Hebrew Bible” to “Old Testament” as “more accurate” (35:47), assigns the Jewish Study Bible, and asks the students to get used to BCE and CE. Fish would not call any of that wrong. He would say “accurate” means “what my community calls it,” that the choice of the Tanakh as the shared core is a Judaica scholar’s choice, and that presenting a community’s conventions as the neutral ground is exactly how interpretive communities reproduce. Her own field’s canon is the one that gets to look like no canon.

Her handling of believers follows. At 29:05 she says a faith commitment can make it hard to read what the text says and that she will point the article of faith out and leave the student to think. Fish’s anti-foundationalism denies there is anywhere to stand that is not an article of faith. The student who reads Genesis as Mosaic and the professor who reads it as J, E, and P are both reading inside communities with rules about what counts as evidence, what a contradiction is, and what a text is. Hayes’s community happens to be the one with tenure. Her invitation to consider the belief behind the question could be returned to sender with no loss of force, and Fish, who enjoys this kind of thing, would say the honest version of her rule is: in this room we read by these conventions, and if you want the grade you will read by them too. He thought that version was fine. He wrote a book, Professional Correctness (1995), arguing that disciplines should teach their practices without pretending to neutrality or world-saving. What he would object to is the sentence at 28:08 that nobody wishes to undermine faith. Teaching a student to see seams changes the Bible he has. You cannot induct someone into an interpretive community and leave his old one intact.

There is a stretch of the lecture Fish would claim as his own. At 22:24 Hayes says the Bible rarely moralizes, puts people in situations, and makes the reader do the work. That is reader-response criticism, the tradition Fish belonged to before he pushed it to its end, and in biblical studies it runs through Robert Alter’s The Art of Biblical Narrative (1981) and Meir Sternberg’s The Poetics of Biblical Narrative (1985), whose puns and gaps and ironies are what Hayes promises the sections will surface. Fish’s early book on Milton, Surprised by Sin (1967),argued that Paradise Lost works by trapping the reader into Satan’s rhetoric and then rebuking him, so that the reader’s experience is the poem’s meaning. Hayes’s Bible does the same to the reader who arrives wanting Jacob to be a saint. But Fish’s later move undoes the comfort. The reader who does the work is a reader trained to do that work. Sunday school readers also work, and their work produces a Jacob who is a model. The seminar’s work produces a deceiver who grows. The text supports whichever reader it is given.

At 8:19 Hayes describes the enormous body of interpretation and commentary built on the Bible, and she schedules the history of interpretation as a treat after the real reading. Fish would invert the order. The history of interpretation is the Bible’s meaning, all there is of it, and the critical reading is one more floor on the edifice with a later date. The claim at 25:54 that the Bible itself does not claim divine authorship assumes the text can make or withhold claims apart from readers. A community that reads “the word of the Lord came to Jeremiah” and “Moses wrote this Torah” in Deuteronomy 31 as covering the whole finds the claim; a community that reads them as covering an oracle and a scroll does not. Fish holds that the finding is all that ever happens.

Wellhausen’s Israel, an evolving tribe that grew up into prophetic ethics, is a Protestant German reading. Kaufmann’s Israel, a folk born with a national intuition, is a Zionist reading. Mark Smith’s Israel, a Canaanite branch that pruned its pantheon, is a reading by a community that trusts inscriptions over narrative. Each Israel is what its community’s rules let the evidence become. Hayes teaches from the third while opening with the second, and Fish would say the switch tells you which community she talks to in print and which she talks to in a lecture hall.

This one is better than the first because she spends the last eleven minutes taking apart the man she spent the first thirty-five building. At 37:43 she says that when you read Kaufmann it is clear he often has to force his evidence, and force it badly. At 44:32 she says biblical religion was less a revolution of Israel against the nations than a civil war of Israel against itself. That second sentence is the thesis of the lecture, and it makes the opening line of Lecture 1 about a people with an idea into something she no longer believes by Wednesday. The idea belonged to a party. The people worshipped what their neighbors worshipped, with an extra god on top.

Her method for presenting Kaufmann is to build him as a deductive system. Posit a realm before and above the gods, and, as she says at 10:14, all of these things follow: limited gods, no sovereign will, mythology, magic, an amoral universe. Remove the realm and, at 23:06, the opposite list follows. That is a good way to teach a thinker and a bad way to describe a religion, and she knows it. At 37:15 she says monotheism and polytheism in the abstract rest on divergent intuitions, then adds that she is not sure either exists anywhere in the world. That aside is the crux. Kaufmann’s “pagan religion” is an ideal type assembled from Greek fate, Babylonian theogony, and Canaanite fertility rites, and no pagan held all of it. Egyptians had Ma’at, a moral order the gods uphold and the king serves. Hammurabi’s Shamash is a god of justice. The Babylonian Theodicy and the Egyptian Instruction for Merikare, which says the god knows every name and cares for men as his cattle, do not describe an amoral cosmos of siblings at war. Kaufmann’s paganism is the Bible’s polemical picture of paganism written up as sociology, and the comparison he runs is between an edited theology and a caricature. Hayes flags the abstraction. She does not say where the caricature came from.

Several of the strong claims she voices for him are overstated in ways a student in section could catch. At 24:49 she says there is no life after death in the Hebrew Bible, that people live seventy years and that is it. Sheol runs through Psalms and Job as a gray survival, the witch of Endor brings up Samuel, and Daniel 12 promises that many who sleep in the dust will awake, which is in the canon even if it is late. The defensible claim is that most of the corpus offers no reward after death, which is a different and more useful sentence. At 25:06 she says magic is represented as useless. Numbers 5 has a priest write curses on a scroll, wash the ink into water, and make a suspected adulteress drink it so that her belly swells. Elisha’s bones raise a dead man. His axe head floats. Kaufmann’s answer, which she gives at 26:19, is that the editors recast every working magic as a witness to God’s will. That answer cannot lose. Any spell that fails proves magic is empty, and any spell that works proves God willed it. A thesis that absorbs both outcomes is not being tested by the text.

At 32:39 she quotes God’s warning to Cain that sin couches at the door and its urge is toward you, and offers it as proof that evil has moved from the metaphysical to the moral realm. The Hebrew verb behind “couches” is robets, and since Speiser’s Anchor Bible commentary scholars have linked it to the Akkadian rabisu, a lurking demon that crouches at doorways. Her proof text for the demythologizing of sin has a demon crouching in it. That does not sink her point. It shows how the text does what she says it does, by keeping the old furniture and changing what it means, and it shows the process is visible on the page rather than finished before the page was written.

The same holds for her claim at 31:41 that no one in the Hebrew Bible ever says the devil made me do it. In 2 Samuel 24 the Lord incites David to take the census that brings a plague. In 1 Chronicles 21, retelling the same story a few centuries later, Satan does it. The devil is being invented inside the canon, by a writer who could no longer stand the earlier version, and the two texts side by side are the strongest evidence anyone could want for her civil-war reading. She does not use them. Nor does she engage the verses where the sovereign good God claims the other side of the ledger, Isaiah 45:7 forming light and creating darkness, making peace and creating evil, or Amos 3:6 asking whether evil befalls a city unless the Lord has done it. Her rebuttal at 34:00 to the student who asks whether monotheism just renamed the metadivine realm as God is that this God is only good. The verses say otherwise, and the theodicy problem she names at 30:02 as a huge problem for monotheistic thought is that problem, produced by the very claim she uses to answer the student.

Her distinction from Geller between Israelite-Judean religion and biblical religion (38:18 to 39:22) is the right tool. Yahweh had no consort in the text (23:41) and had one in the inscriptions, and the gap between those two facts is the gap between what people did and what the editors wanted. The historicized festivals she describes at 28:42 show the process mid-stride: Leviticus 23 gives Sukkot an agricultural rationale and Deuteronomy 16 and Leviticus 23:43 give it a historical one, and both survive. Genesis 6 with its divine beings marrying human women she calls, at 41:25, a fluid boundary if you ask me. Psalm 82 gets a paraphrase at 41:45 in which God stands up in the council and tells the other gods they do not know what they are doing. All of that is Mark Smith’s case, and the “minority movement that grew to prominence over centuries” at 43:38 is Morton Smith’s Yahweh-alone party. Neither is named. An undergraduate lecture rarely credits the scholars whose conclusions it delivers, and the effect is that Kaufmann gets a name and a hundred pages while the people who refuted him arrive as “most scholars conjecture.”

One thing she gets that Kaufmann’s critics sometimes lose. At 37:34 she holds that the difference between Israel’s God in the monotheizing sources and the gods of the neighbors is qualitative, and the case for that survives the demolition. A god who is the source of all being, with no birth, no consort, no rival, and no substance a magician can work on, is a different kind of object from Marduk even if Marduk’s hymns sometimes reach toward the same thing. The lecture’s own trajectory is the argument: the object was not there in 900 BCE, was there in the sixth century, and the road between was a fight inside Judah that the text records without meaning to.

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